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Executive Summary 
This paper provides an analysis of the opportunities and challenges facing the 
institutionalization of inclusive growth in Nepal. It uses a political settlements framework to 
identify policies that may have a significant impact on accelerating inclusive growth and that 
may be feasible to implement. There are numerous challenges to a sustainable trajectory of 
inclusive growth, including mobilizations based on divisive identities that could increase 
tensions in the medium term. The federal transition will push institutions to support a more 
decentralised pattern of rent allocation, due to a greater emergence and mobilisation of the 
‘intermediate classes’. These constitute around 30-40% of the population, and include e.g. 
village school teachers, middle peasants, small-town lawyers, NGO workers, educated 
unemployed. This group has shown to be important in the evolution of political settlements 
elsewhere in South Asia, providing critical organising capacity for political parties. 
 This will mean that power, and competition for rents will also become more decentralised. 
Political and government institutions will be challenged to support a more decentralised 
pattern of rent allocation and management. Exactly how this will evolve depends on a 
number of factors, including the relative emphasis placed on the local and provincial levels 
of government in the federal transition. Large sources of rents will continue to distort some 
markets, and critical constraints such as property rights, rule of law and infrastructure may 
be unlikely to dramatically improve given Nepal’s current level of governance. However, the 
low productive capacities of enterprise is a key binding constraint to inclusive economic 
transformation in Nepal that (unlike others) may be feasible to address in the short- to 
medium-term.  
The paper identifies the characteristics of the Nepali political settlement, its evolution, and 
the implications for the implementation of institutions supporting inclusive growth. 
Institutions create new incomes (or rents) and the implications of the competition over 
rents depends on the distribution of power described by the political settlement. The latter 
therefore constrains the types of institutions that will work best in particular contexts. The 
political settlement in developing countries means that the governance structures and 
institutions that work in advanced capitalist countries are not immediately enforceable or 
effective in developing ones. Moreover, the specific institutions that will work in a 
developing country depend on a deeper understanding of its particular political settlement 
and how that is evolving.  
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Existing policies ignore the political settlement and have largely failed because the rents 
that were created to induce investments and productivity growth were captured without 
delivering good results in most cases. Better designed policies can use policy rents more 
innovatively to create new organizational capabilities in SMEs, and in sectors with good 
employment prospects. Key measures to consider include policies that incentivise foreign 
investment and knowledge transfer in a way that delivers rents after productivity increases 
have been achieved. This can support devolution and make inclusive growth a sustainable 
strategy. Nepal’s recent history of successful social mobilizations, its ongoing transition to a 
federal structure and near-completion of historic elections (at the time of writing) reflect 
dramatic changes in its political settlement. It is not business-as-usual in Nepal.  
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1. Introduction 
How can Nepal accelerate and sustain inclusive growth? What are its most promising 
economic opportunities? What are the feasible governance structures that could enable 
their achievement? Was the Maoist insurgency a blip in the unchanging flow of unstable 
Nepali politics? Or has the Nepali ‘political settlement’ changed as a result, and how does 
that affect the design of inclusive growth policies? This study addresses these interrelated 
questions using the lens of the political settlements framework and the rents analysis that 
underpins it. We argue that the Nepali political settlement has indeed changed and is likely 
to keep changing in ways that will affect future development prospects. Some of these 
changes offer opportunities for new institutional interventions that can sustain more 
inclusive economics and politics, particularly by combining devolved political institutions 
with economic policies and institutions supporting the growth of SMEs in different regions.  
We make our case by looking at two interrelated issues and the implications for policy. The 
first concerns the characteristics of Nepal’s political settlement and the likely direction of its 
evolution in the future. The second is the set of institutional constraints that have limited 
inclusive growth in the past. The two are closely related. Our definition of a political 
settlement is the distribution of organizational power. This matters because it determines 
the bargaining power of different formal and informal organizations competing for rents. 
Rents refer to the incremental incomes associated with particular institutions or policies, 
including the ones promoting growth. The distribution of organizational power then 
determines how specific institutions and policies are distorted or overturned as a result of 
the competition to capture rents. The political settlement therefore determines the types of 
institutions and policies that are most likely to work in that political settlement, given 
feasible improvements in governance capabilities. We identify the characteristics of the 
political settlement in Nepal that made it difficult in the past to overcome some of the most 
important constraints on inclusive growth. Finally, we discuss feasible ways of breaking out 
of some of these constraints given the characteristics of the political settlement.  
Table 1 shows that Nepal’s growth has lagged behind its South Asian neighbours, 
particularly after 1990. The lagging growth undoubtedly has something to do with the 
decade-long insurgency and conflict in the country that began in the mid-1990s. The other 
South Asian country with poor performance in recent years is Pakistan, which has also 
suffered from conflict. But of greater concern is that growth has not rebounded after the 
end of conflict in 2006. Table 1 ends in 2014/15. The earthquake of 2015 had a further 
negative effect, offset by an uptick in growth 2016/2017 to 7.5 percent, largely as a result of 
recovery from a low base, and reconstruction largely funded by foreign inflows. Longer term 
prospects, however, depend on the development of productive sectors, and in particular of 
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manufacturing. Nepal is currently around 2 percentage points behind Bangladesh and India 
In terms of per capita growth rates and this can rapidly compound into significant 
differences in welfare over time.  
Figure 1 shows that structural transformation in Nepal towards greater industrialization has 
been virtually blocked since the 1990s, with the shares of industry and manufacturing 
actually shrinking. For countries at low levels of per capita income like Nepal, sustainable 
growth should lead to rising shares of industry and manufacturing, and indeed the rapid 
growth of labour-intensive manufacturing is important for ensuring that growth remains 
inclusive. At early stages of development, the share of agriculture should also decline (but 
agricultural output should rapidly increase) and the share of services should increase. The 
latter two changes are indeed happening in Nepal. But the expected rises in the shares of 
industry and manufacturing have not been happening, and instead services have grown 
faster. This matters because manufacturing creates employment for relatively less educated 
workers, and creates tradable products that can be exported to import technology and 
consumer goods.  
Table 1 Nepal Comparative Growth in South Asia 
 Nepal Bangladesh India Pakistan 
 GDP Growth Rates 
1960-80 2.3 2.4 3.5 5.9 
1980-90 4.5 4.0 5.6 6.3 
1990-00 4.8 4.7 5.6 3.9 
2000-05 3.2 5.1 6.7 5.0 
2005-10 4.4 6.1 6.7 3.4 
2010-15 4.3 6.3 6.7 4.0 
 Per Capita GDP Growth Rates 
1960-80 0.4 -0.3 1.2 3.1 
1980-90 2.2 1.3 3.2 2.9 
1990-00 2.4 2.5 3.6 1.4 
2000-05 1.7 3.3 5.0 2.8 
2005-10 3.4 4.8 6.5 1.3 
2010-15 3.1 5.1 5.4 1.8 
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators (accessed September 2017) and Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy, 2015. 
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Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators (accessed September 2017) 
Figure 1 Nepal: Sectoral Shares in GDP 
 
Some of the constraints on inclusive growth in Nepal are well known. The literature has 
identified weak governance and a poor investment climate, political instability that has 
resulted in governments changing frequently, regional and ethnic tensions that have 
resulted in violent conflicts, poor infrastructure and power supply constraints, the 
difficulties of accessing international ports, shortcomings in skills and education, poor labour 
relations and frequent strikes (Asian Development Bank 2009; Xu and Hager 2017). None of 
these constraints are easy to overcome, and some are very difficult to address.  
While governance weaknesses are very important, the literature is often very misleading in 
identifying the types of governance capabilities that countries like Nepal need to acquire. 
The misleading advice often comes from looking at the ‘good governance’ characteristics of 
advanced capitalist countries and arguing that achieving these governance characteristics 
will ensure inclusive growth. These include the capability to enforce stable property rights 
and a rule of law. However, these institutions are very difficult to enforce in poor countries 
because their political settlements are such that powerful organizations do not support the 
achievement of these governance characteristics (Khan 2012b). Instead, history shows that 
successful developing countries did not have ‘good governance’ at an early stage of 
development. Rather, they had capabilities that we have described as ‘developmental 
governance’, which helped them to sustain and accelerate inclusive growth and maintain 
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political stability while gradually strengthening their rule of law, the enforcement of formal 
rules and property rights, systemic anti-corruption and rule-following democracy. The 
critical policy question is therefore to identify the appropriate governance capabilities that 
may be feasible for a country like Nepal to aim for in the short to medium term. 
Political instability in Nepal has also often manifested itself as short-lived governments. This 
has been bad for coherent policy-making but this problem too cannot be easily addressed 
by policy if it reflects the organization of political power. But fortunately the organization of 
politics has been changing and there is a possibility that more stable governments may 
emerge in the future. At least part of the problem in Nepal has been the relatively limited 
inclusion of the middle and lower strata of Nepali society in traditional political parties. In 
such a polity, parties can get votes with limited organizational and mobilizing capabilities. As 
the organizational power of winning parties has often not been very clear, power and 
resource sharing arrangements at the top were based on understandings between elites 
rather than their real capabilities of organizing large numbers of people. These types of 
ruling coalitions can obviously be unstable. However, the insurgency and the characteristics 
of the subsequent peace have brought into mainstream politics parties of the left that have 
been much better at organizing people. This is likely to set up competitive pressures in 
Nepal for parties to become more organized. It is likely that Nepal will move in the direction 
of other South Asian countries where political parties compete to include organizers from a 
variety of classes and constituencies in large (formal and informal) organizational structures. 
In the typical South Asian scenario, the capacity to win votes is closely related to the 
capacity to attract large numbers of organizers within the party and therefore to its 
organizational power. Winning parties are therefore generally more powerful, and to the 
extent that the distribution of power remains stable, it is difficult to change governments 
through elite pressures and negotiations. While there are some indications that Nepal is 
travelling in this direction, government instability may still persist for some time.   
Other major constraints, like infrastructure and electricity are also only likely to be gradually 
addressed. Overcoming these constraints to a significant extent requires large investments 
as well as demanding governance capabilities, for instance to acquire land without 
triggering huge conflicts and to ensure that huge investments can be mobilized and 
managed. These governance capacities are limited in poor economies and so early 
development has to happen in a context of relatively poor infrastructure and power supplies 
but with continuous incremental improvements over time. What is more, the development 
of infrastructure does not by itself guarantee that competitive enterprises will emerge to 
use this infrastructure. The missing capabilities of enterprises is usually a far more binding 
constraint in most developing countries and policy needs to prioritize that. As capable 
competitive enterprises emerge and begin to generate wealth and taxes, and the 
organizational capabilities of society improve, the governance capabilities and resources of 
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governments also tend to improve so that more ambitious infrastructure and public good 
projects can be effectively implemented. 
An identification of a list of constraints is therefore not useful in itself, as there are very 
many constraints in a developing country. To be useful, the analysis has to identify the 
constraints that may be feasible to address over the short to medium term, and have a 
relatively high impact on triggering inclusive growth. If such constraints can be identified 
and addressed, other constraints can be sequentially addressed as the growth generated 
creates the resources and capabilities that make other problems more feasible to address, 
in turn sustaining the inclusive growth process. The aim of a political settlements analysis is 
to identify the constraints that can be feasibly addressed to trigger growth, and the types of 
policies that are most likely to work to achieve these goals in particular contexts. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the political settlements and rents 
framework that we use to examine policy challenges for sustaining inclusive growth in 
Nepal.  Section 3 provides an introduction to the major rent and policy challenges in Nepal 
and outlines why we believe the political settlement is at an extremely interesting phase in 
its evolution, offering both challenges but also opportunities for reform to sustain inclusive 
growth. Section 4 describes relevant characteristics of the Nepal economy and the 
challenges of inclusive growth. Section 5 provides a brief history of how politics has evolved 
in Nepal over the last few decades as the backdrop to our political settlements analysis. 
Section 6 refers to an important development that is likely to influence the evolution of 
Nepal’s political settlement in the future, the intensifying competition between China and 
India in Nepal. Section 7 uses all this information to provide a mapping of how the political 
settlement in Nepal has evolved from the Rana period to the current day, together with 
some scenarios of possible directions of further evolution. Section 8 uses this analysis of the 
political settlement and its evolution to look at the major rent management issues in Nepal 
that are pertinent for inclusive growth. The aim here is to provide a qualitative analysis both 
of the scale of each problem but also the feasibility of addressing it. Our underlying theory 
of change is that reform must begin with relatively high impact but feasible changes that 
make other changes more possible later on. Finally, in Section 9, the major policy 
implications from the previous section are summarized.  
 
2. Nepal’s Economy and the Inclusive Growth Challenge  
• The Nepali economy is driven by high levels of remittances but this also makes it 
potentially vulnerable  
• The excessive dependence of the economy on India is on balance detrimental  
• improving growth rates while reducing inequality is a serious challenge 
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Nepal is a low income country in the classification of the World Bank and has achieved less 
than the average performance of low income countries for most years since 1950. GDP 
growth was severely affected by the earthquake in 2015 as well as the economic blockade 
by India, and during the years from 1996 to 2006, growth was affected by the Maoist 
insurgency. Even though the situation is now much improved, political instability and lack of 
a productive workforce are two of the constraints for the Nepali economy that are most 
frequently identified by ‘opinion makers’, and labour and business representatives 
according to a perception survey conducted by the IFC (South Asia Enterprise Development 
Facility 2013). Both problems are linked to the Nepali political settlement where 
governments change frequently and the lack of good employment opportunities in 
productive organizations drives a large segment of the young population abroad as 
economic migrants. The share of the services sector has been growing at the expense of 
manufacturing as we saw in Figure 1. The growth of the service sector is common to all 
South Asian countries, but the low and declining share of manufacturing in Nepal (5.8% of 
GDP in 2016) puts it at odds with comparator countries like India (16.5% of GDP in 2016) 
and Bangladesh (17.9% of GDP in 2016) according to World Bank figures. In common with 
other South Asian countries, but again to a greater extent, its informal economy is 
substantial and employs 96 percent of the country’s employable population (Suwal and Pant 
2009). While the service sector contributes over half of Nepal’s GDP it has low productivity 
overall as in most developing countries. Expanding high-value services requires very serious 
investments in human capital and is unlikely to create jobs on the scale required. Table 1 
also shows that Nepal has performed less well in terms of per capita GDP growth when 
compared to neighbouring India and Bangladesh.  
There has, however, been very good progress in poverty reduction. In its transition to 
democracy since the 1990s, Nepal has made much progress in reducing absolute poverty. 
Studies have shown that the poverty gap index (measuring how far poor sections of the 
population are from the poverty line) is declining (Asian Development Bank 2012). The 
proportion of the population living under $1.25 a day declined from 68 percent in 1996 to 
24.8 percent in 2011 (Asian Development Bank 2012). The government has targeted a 
reduction to 17 percent by the end of 2018/19 and wants to graduate out of being a Least 
Developed Country (LDC) to a developing country status by 2022 (Dhungana 2017). 
However, growth has remained sluggish, and in particular labour-intensive manufacturing 
that is a key driver of inclusive growth has not made very significant progress. According to 
the World Bank, Nepal is unlikely to become a lower middle income country before 2030. 
Even that will require sustaining growth and raising productivity in an economy with low 
productive capabilities across industry, agriculture and services.  
Poverty in the economically backward mountainous regions is the highest amongst Nepal’s 
geographical regions and displays a rising trend (Asian Development Bank 2012). In terms of 
7 
 
its performance on the Human Development Index, Nepal is currently the worst performing 
South Asian country with the exception of Afghanistan, as we see in Figure 2. The HDI values 
within Nepal are improving overall, though inter-regional inequalities are increasing largely 
driven by caste and ethnicity-based disparities (Government of Nepal National Planning 
Commission and UNDP 2014). Indeed HDI disparities based on caste and ethnicity are wider 
than geographical disparities.  
 
 
Source: Figure 2.1 Nepal Human Development Report 2014. 
Figure 2 Human Development Indicator Trends in South Asia 
 
Table 2 Ethnicity and Poverty in Nepal 
Caste / Ethnicity % of 
population 
Poverty incidence 
1995/6 
Poverty incidence 
2003/4 
Hill Brahman / Chhetri 30.9 34 19 
Terai Brahman / Chhetri 1.9   
Newars 5.5 19 14 
Terai Middle Castes 12.9 29 21 
Hill Dalits 7.1 59 41 
Terai Dalits 4.7   
Hill Janajatis 23.0 49 44 
Terai Janajatis 8.7 53 36 
Religious minorities (Muslims) 4.3 44 41 
Unidentified 1.0   
Source:  Table 2.2 OPM Working Paper 2010-03, based on DFID and World Bank figures 
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The population census of Nepal in 2011 recorded 123 languages with Nepali being spoken 
by 44.6 percent of the population. The ethnic composition changes as one moves from East 
to West as well as North to South. Political institutions and the composition of the ruling 
coalition ensured the exclusion of most of these social groups from political power and 
access to rents (S. Jones 2010).  
Table 2 shows that Nepal’s population can roughly be divided into three segments: a third 
composed of upper castes including the Newars, a third consisting of various indigenous 
groups who range from those of Tibetan and Mongol ethnicity in the hills and mountains to 
other indigenous groups living in the Terai or foothills who are sometimes collectively 
referred to as Janajatis (though this is an oversimplification of their ethnic complexity). The 
final third of the population are Madhesis who generally speak dialects of Hindi as their first 
language and occupy the Terai region. They are not a caste or ethnic grouping but the term 
Madheshi is used to identify Hindi speaking populations in the Terai who share many 
cultural similarities with the bordering Indian state of Bihar. Table 2 also shows that Dalits 
are the poorest group in Nepal, closely followed by Muslims, while Newars and hill Brahmins 
enjoy the lowest incidence of poverty. This is a policy conundrum because policies 
supporting growth have to be designed so that they do not exacerbate the already quite 
serious inequalities across ethnicities, regions and castes. 
Nepali politics has been dominated by upper caste Hindus, including a social sub-group 
called the Newars (Prasai 2007). However a substantial portion of the population including 
Tharus, other indigenous people, Dalits and Muslims have been and continue to be 
underrepresented in political organizations (Robinson 2007). In terms of ownership of 
business organizations, the upper castes once again dominate, but Marwaris, a trading 
community originally from India who were brought in by the Ranas, also have a significant 
presence (Shakya 2011). The Madhesis have been agitating, sometimes violently, for more 
representation and have made significant headway in terms of political participation since 
the 1950s, but most sections of Madhesi feel more needs to be done (Jha 2017). Before the 
1950s the Terai border regions served as a buffer region between British India and Nepal 
and was occupied by groups like Tharus and some Madhesis. While the Terai was sparsely 
populated prior to that time due to the presence of thick forests that were malaria infested, 
deforestation during colonial times to build sleepers for the Indian Railways and a 
programme to spread DDT, an insecticide that kills mosquitos enabled residents of the hills 
and others from across the border in India to populate the Terai (International Crisis Group 
2007). As a result of the land clearing, the Tharus and lower castes among the Madhesis lost 
some of their land as ethnicities from other parts of Nepal moved in. Tharus in Dang 
however lost out much more than Tharus in Chitwan which still has Tharu landlords but this 
exploitation was nonetheless seen as based on ethnicity (Guneratne 2002). 
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The two defining characteristics of the contemporary Nepali economy are first, its 
dependence on remittances by migrant Nepali workers and second, the dominance of India 
in its trade basket and its relatively open borders with that country. In 1996 it is estimated 
that one in four Nepali households received some form of income from remittances. By 
2004 this figure was one in three and by 2011 it was more than one in two. Around 7.3 
percent of its population was abroad (Population Education & Health Research Centre 
2016). Figure 3 shows that Nepal’s economy has the highest share of remittances in South 
Asia and is indeed one of the highest recipient of remittances in the world with remittances 
accounting for 30 percent of GDP in 2015. Remittances have helped to keep consumption 
inequality low but exposes Nepal to shocks in the host economies. It has also meant that the 
Nepali economy has lost a significant portion of its skilled workers. The absolute numbers 
working abroad have grown dramatically in recent years, as shown in  
 
Table 3. The inward flows also allow the Nepali currency to be consistently pegged to the 
Indian rupee at an overvalued exchange rate that makes other Nepali exports 
uncompetitive.  
 
 
Source: (World Bank 2017: Figure 1.4).  
Figure 3 Remittances and the Economy: South Asia 
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Table 3 Nepali Workers Working Abroad 
 
Source: (Xu and Hager 2017: Table 13). 
 
Table 4 Minimum Monthly Wages in Current Dollars 
Source: (Xu and Hager 2017: Table 3)  
The scale of migration and therefore the scarcity of domestic workers means that Nepali wages are 
artificially high given the average productivity of the country. Minimum wages are higher than both India 
and Vietnam, which have much higher per capita incomes ( 
Table 4), thereby discouraging formal sector investments in tradable sectors (Xu and Hager 
2017). It has also been argued that a large number of working age people being absent from 
the electorate makes governments less accountable for economic performance (H. Jones 
and Basnett 2013). The combined effects of all these factors have meant that the growth in 
the shares of manufacturing and industry in total economic activity have been unusually 
constrained in Nepal, as we saw in Figure 1. It is not surprising that the World Bank has 
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described Nepal as an ‘atypical economic transformation’ in its latest Nepal Country 
Economic Memorandum (World Bank 2017). 
The dominance of the trade with India is the other distinguishing feature of the Nepali 
economy. India is Nepal’s largest trading partner and accounts for 65 percent of its total 
trade. It is also the major transit point for landlocked Nepal as 85 percent of the goods 
Nepal imports, irrespective of origin, travel through India into Nepal (World Bank 2017). 
Though Nepal has borders with both India and China, its historical economic links with India 
have been deeper because of the accessible terrain on its southern border. However as 
Indian competitiveness in many sectors has moved ahead of Nepal, the relatively open 
borders create challenges for Nepali tradable sectors that initially have lower levels of 
productivity and often also have higher wages. This has made it difficult for Nepal to attract 
investment into these sectors, and indeed it has been losing out to bordering Indian states 
on FDI (Unknown 2017).  
These factors, together with its overvalued currency pegged to the Indian rupee, can explain 
why Nepal sucks in Indian imports and runs a huge trade deficit with India (and the rest of 
the world). India’s share in Nepali imports is 65.9 percent and 66.3 percent of Nepal’s 
exports go to India (Table 5). But the absolute value of imports greatly exceeds that of 
exports. The terms of trade are also skewed against Nepal as it mainly exports primary 
commodities like cardamom, ginger or low value added products like jute goods and GI 
Pipes. Nepali imports from India are higher-value products like medicines, vehicles and 
spare parts though commodities like rice, paddy and mild steel billets are also imported. 
Even though the borders are open and the two countries have signed a preferential trade 
agreement, Nepali products find it difficult to find markets in India.  
 
Table 5 Nepal's trade with India and China 
1. Share in total export (%)                                        2012/13             2013/14           2014/15 
India 66.3  64.8  65.5  
China 2.7  3.1  2.6  
Other Countries 31.0  32.1  31.9  
2. Share in total import (%)                                       2012/13             2013/14          2014/15 
India 65.9  66.9  63.5  
China 11.2  10.3  12.9  
Other Countries 22.9  22.8  23.6  
Source CMES Annual 2014/15 
Table 6 shows the scale of the large and growing trade deficit with India, which in 2014/15, 
was around 63 percent of Nepal’s overall trade deficit. Not only is India more competitive, it 
has powerful internal lobbies of producers pushing for the protection of its markets. In the 
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few sectors where Nepal is more competitive, for instance in the manufacture of vegetable 
‘ghee’, a cooking medium, or copper wire, India often applies quota-based restrictions in 
response to its internal pressures to protect its own industries. 
 Any hope that Nepali manufacturers could upgrade their technologies by moving up the 
Indian value chain would also come up against the superior lobbying abilities of powerful 
manufacturing associations in India who would naturally want to reserve the more lucrative 
parts of the chain for themselves. Under the Gujral Doctrine of the 1990s when India was 
attempting to exercise leadership in South Asia by offering preferential trade opportunities 
to its neighbours, India changed 22 tariff lines for Nepal and reduced duties to zero on these 
lines. But these preferential rates were rapidly withdrawn due to intense lobbying from 
manufacturers on the Indian side who were threatened by a few Nepali sectors. A 
combination of effective lobbying by Indian manufacturers to protect its internal markets in 
a few areas where Nepal was competitive, and the lack of Nepali competitiveness in most 
sectors, add up to Nepal not being able to use the vast Indian market to its advantage. 
Table 6 Nepal's Trade Balance with India, Millions of NPR 
2000/01 -28,670.70 
2001/02 -28,665.90 
2002/03 -44,494.20 
2003/04 -47,962.40 
2004/05 -49,758.60 
2005/06 -66,428.40 
2006/07 -74,143.50 
2007/08 -103,820.80 
2008/09 -121,431.70 
2009/10 -177,120.60 
2010/11 -218,564.80 
2011/12 -249,773.30 
2012/13 -316,031.20 
2013/14 -418,333.40 
2014/15 -435,791.40 
2015/16 -139,383.30 
Source: Economic Survey Report 2016, mof.gov.np  
Interestingly, in a survey published in 2012, trade and transit arrangements with India were 
identified as the main constraint by larger firms (with over 100 employees) while small and 
medium sized firms identified this as a much less important constraint. Trade and transit 
arrangements were also a more important constraint for businesses in the border towns of 
Biratnagar and Birganj which are dependent on cross border trade with India than for 
Kathmandu and Pokhra (Margon 2012). While these results are not really surprising, it 
would have been good to get a more detailed set of responses from the survey about the 
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nature of these constraints. We would expect Nepali firms that were competitive to prefer 
freer trade with lower transaction costs. On the other hand, the more typical Nepali large 
firm facing a competitiveness deficit with India may well prefer more protection as they 
would probably find it difficult to compete with both legally imported and smuggled Indian 
products.  
 
3. Political Settlements, Rents and Governance  
• The distribution of organizational power affects the operation of economic and 
political institutions  
• Changes in institutions can induce responses by powerful organizations that affect 
the operation of these institutions  
• Mapping how particular institutions generate rents (policy induced incomes) is 
necessary to track the responses of organizations and explain how these institutions 
work in that context  
• The political settlements framework connects these dots to identify opportunities for 
institutional and policy reform that are likely to be effective  
We address the governance challenges facing Nepal using a political settlements approach. 
This section provides a brief introduction to concepts before we move to an application to 
Nepal. A political settlement is a description of the distribution of organizational power in a 
society at various levels appropriate for addressing specific policy problems (Khan 1995, 
2010, 2012a). The distribution of power is relevant for understanding the likelihood of a 
particular organization ‘holding out’ for rents in conflicts ranging from economic 
competition in price wars, to political competitions to change government policies, and 
more overt violent conflicts. Powerful organizations have greater ‘holding power’ and can 
outlast competitors in these costly conflicts. They are therefore more likely to win in market 
and political competition and get policies and institutions working in their interests because 
other organizations are more likely to exit or compromise.  
From the perspective of institutional change and policy formulation, powerful organizations 
have a greater likelihood of influencing changes in formal policy through lobbying. This is 
the common route through which organizational power is exercised in advanced countries 
through formal and rule-following rent seeking in the form of lobbying, political 
contributions and so on. In rule-following advanced countries, the relevant governance 
challenge is to ensure that a wide range of interests can formally influence policy so that 
sectional rent seeking by some interests does not result in restrictive monopolies and other 
damaging rents. But powerful organizations are also likely to influence the implementation 
of institutions and policies so that the actual operation of rules gives them the benefits they 
want. This is particularly important in developing countries, where powerful organizations 
are likely to distort the implementation of formal institutions and policies to capture rents. 
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One reason for this is that organizational power in developing countries is more likely to be 
based on the capacity to mobilize informal networks. It is difficult to lobby for formal 
policies that specifically target rents to an informal network. It is more likely that powerful 
organizations in developing countries will therefore capture a (large) part of their rents by 
distorting formal institutions and capturing rents informally for their informal networks.  
This is an important reason why there is much greater informality in the implementation of 
formal rules in developing countries, why formal institutions and rules appear to be difficult 
to implement, and why there is so much overt rule-violating behaviour that often manifests 
itself as corruption. All these phenomena are related to a distribution of organizational 
power that works by distorting the implementation of formal institutions to bring about a 
distribution of benefits that reflects this informal distribution of power. The governance 
challenge in these contexts is more complex because a quick transition to a rule-following 
society is not possible. Here, the challenge is to identify institutions and policies that will 
achieve socially desirable results despite the types of distortions that powerful organizations 
can be expected to attempt and to strengthen enforcement capabilities of the state in 
targeted areas to further improve outcomes (Khan 2017).  
The main aim of the political settlements framework is not to try and predict why particular 
policies or institutions emerge. Policies or institutions do not mechanically reflect the 
distribution of power in a society. Governments in power represent particular 
constituencies and are influenced by international pressures and their own ideologies. A 
variety of policies and institutional strategies can therefore emerge at different times. The 
dynamic question is whether particular policies survive and how they are implemented given 
the evolving distribution of power in a society. In advanced countries, powerful 
organizations that are adversely affected by particular institutions and policies can be 
expected to lobby and put pressure on governments to revisit these rules, or compensate 
them in other ways. In developing countries, the response is likely to include distortions and 
corruption in the implementation of particular policies to modify their implementation in 
line with the interests of powerful organizations or networks, many of which are informal. 
The political settlement framework therefore has to be used in a dynamic way to 
understand how a social system tends towards an ‘equilibrium’ between the distribution of 
rents and the distribution of power, without presuming that it is ever actually in equilibrium, 
or that the distribution of power across organizations is static. Sometimes institutions and 
policies change or are modified, sometimes the conflicts unleashed result in changes in the 
distribution of power. The most important part of the analysis from the policy advisors’ 
perspective is to assess how institutions and policies can be redesigned given our 
assessment of the current distribution of power and its likely trajectories of change so that 
better social outcomes are achieved. 
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An analysis of rents is necessary for looking at this dynamic process. Political and economic 
organizations are both concerned about institutions and policies because these affect the 
distribution of incomes and benefits. We describe the incremental changes in benefits 
associated with particular institutions or policies as ‘rents’. Some of the ways in which 
institutions or policies determine rents are obvious, like subsidies, or the benefits going to 
particular firms as a result of tariffs, or the incremental incomes of monopolists when 
policies restrict access to markets. Other rents are subtle, such as incremental gains and 
losses for organizations as a result of regulations, for instance those that limit the use of 
dirty technologies or require minimum construction standards.  
Organizations affected by particular institutions and policies can be expected to try and 
change policies that adversely affect them or to informally modify their implementation so 
that they can capture or retain rents by violating rules. This is one way of explaining why 
many potentially beneficial interventions may fail to get introduced or be properly 
implemented in particular contexts. In developing countries, powerful organizations and 
networks often capture rents by distorting the implementation of formal rules. For instance, 
tariffs may fail to promote domestic industries if the rents are captured by low productivity 
firms who then prevent their removal, or by smuggling networks who prevent the 
emergence of productive enterprises; credit programmes can be distorted through 
corruption that diverts the new finance to organizations who were not the intended 
beneficiaries and so on.  
The political settlement framework goes further. Its aim is not just to explain why particular 
institutions may have been distorted or blocked, but also to identify potential opportunities 
and solutions that have a higher chance of being implemented in that political settlement. 
There are many different solutions to particular development challenges. If allocating 
resources through the public school system results in the employment of unqualified 
teachers who happen to be politically connected (a form of rent capture by informal 
networks and organizations), the political settlement framework can be used to evaluate 
whether alternative methods of allocating resources for education using NGOs or other 
organizations may work relatively better in that context. If tariffs to protect infant industries 
are failing because powerful networks are engaged in smuggling to capture these rents in 
unproductive ways, the political settlement framework can be used to evaluate whether 
other forms of delivering support to infant industries may be less likely to be captured given 
the current configuration of organizational power.  
Some rents are captured by, or are deliberately allocated to politically powerful 
organizations. While this may have economic costs, there may also be a political benefit of 
maintaining political stability and averting even more costly conflicts. Not all ‘wasteful’ rents 
are really wasteful when these political costs are factored in. However, the proper allocation 
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and management of all rents are important not only for maintaining political stability but 
also for achieving important development outcomes, like improving skills, developing new 
entrepreneurial capabilities, improving health and education outcomes, developing green 
technologies and so on. The misallocation or distortion of rents may have damaging 
political, economic and developmental consequences. In these cases, the political 
settlements analysis aims to identify alternative ways of managing these rents so that better 
development outcomes can be achieved given the distribution of organizational power.  
The political settlements framework therefore suggests two parallel lines of analysis. First, it 
identifies the importance of mapping important rents in an economy to examine how the 
current configuration of institutions, organizations, and economic opportunities are driving 
or constraining growth. This analysis provides a map of how institutions and organizations 
are involved in the creation, management or allocation of particular rents, and the 
implications for growth and political stability. The second plank examines the characteristics 
and evolution of the political settlement. This looks at the configuration of organizational 
power in society and how this has been changing over time. Organizational power depends 
on social movements and mobilizations and how particular organizations have mobilized 
these to enhance their organizational power. But it is also affected by other autonomous 
factors like changes in economic capabilities and opportunities that affect the relative 
power of firms in different sectors, changes in global economic conditions, technological 
changes, the discovery of natural resources, international support for or resistance to 
particular organizations, and so on. All of these processes can change the distribution of 
organizational power in different parts of a society. 
The two parts of the analysis are clearly closely related. Autonomous changes in 
organizational power can create new challenges and opportunities for managing growth and 
political stability, while autonomous changes in institutions and policies can result in 
mobilizations by organizations to support, block or distort these institutions. This two-way 
relationship is not fully determinate or mechanical and the challenge for policy is to identify 
the most effective interventions to nudge the evolution of the social system in positive 
ways, by supporting inclusive growth, political stability and helping to reduce conflicts, 
depending on what the most important challenges happen to be. 
 
The evolution of political organizations  
We will map phases in the configuration of political organizations using a classification 
developed in Khan (2010) and summarized in Box 1. Changes in the configuration of power 
across political organizations have important implications for the time horizon of 
governments and their capabilities of implementation, including the management of 
different types of rents. We will then look at the capabilities and distribution of power 
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across economic organizations (firms) to get an overview of the political settlement and the 
implications for policy.  
 
Box 1 Political Organizations and Political Settlements 
The distribution of power across political organisations and within the ruling coalition 
are both important. The capabilities of economic organisations and of the 
bureaucracy (including the military) are also important components of the overall 
configuration of power. However, the configuration of political power is particularly 
important and we use the framework in Khan (2010) to describe this aspect of the 
political settlement as shown below. 
 
The configuration of power can vary across two dimensions. The horizontal axis 
shows the power of political organizations that are currently not in the ruling 
coalition. The vertical axis shows the holding power of higher levels of the ruling 
coalition relative to lower levels. The top left hand corner of the diagram describes 
potential developmental coalitions where the ruling coalition faces weak opposition 
from excluded groups and the leadership has effective power over their own 
organisations. This combination results in long time horizons, as the ruling coalition is 
not vulnerable and has significant implementation capabilities as its lower levels can 
be disciplined by higher levels. These coalitions may appear to be authoritarian but 
rarely have to use violence. In principle, they could also be elected to power. 
Countries like South Korea in the 1960s would be in this region.  
As excluded organisations become more powerful, the ruling coalition may have to 
use more repression or violence to stay in power. We then have the emergence of 
vulnerable authoritarian coalitions as we move towards the top right. These 
coalitions can also be developmental for a while but they have a shorter time horizon 
South Korea 1960s Pakistan 1960s 
South Asian 
democracies  
Indian Congress 
1950s and 1960s 
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and the leadership eventually engages in more unproductive rent capture, even if 
their control over their followers remains strong. Many authoritarian regimes in 
developing countries, like Pakistan in the 1960s are of this type.  
However, an authoritarian ruling coalition also tends to lose control over its lower 
levels because it is difficult to control them when powerful excluded organisations 
can offer them better deals. Parts of the ruling coalition can begin to leave and build 
new organisations or join the opposition hoping to get better deals. As multiple 
parties emerge, each party has weaker control over their organisations because 
disaffected members can leave. When political organizations are of this type we are 
in the bottom right hand corner described as competitive clientelism. This 
configuration of power typically supports democratic competition in developing 
countries. South Asian democracies are often of this type. Democracy can be more 
stable and less repressive than a vulnerable authoritarian coalition if organisational 
power has actually become fragmented, but democratic parties also have short time 
horizons and weak implementation capacities. If the competing parties can work out 
‘live and let live’ arrangements for replacing each other in power, institutional and 
policy stability may emerge with good development outcomes in some contexts. 
Finally, a configuration of power where a large political organisation faces limited 
opposition can result in a weak dominant party in the bottom left hand corner. Such 
a ruling coalition may have limited implementation capability because by including 
almost everyone the leadership pays the price of not being able to impose discipline 
on their own organisation. Work dominant parties can be stable but their rent 
management is not very developmental. The Congress Party in India during the 
1950s and 1960s was of this type. These ideal types are simplifications and many 
examples lie on the boundaries of these configurations: for instance dominant 
parties with strong organisations can be close to being developmental coalitions, 
developmental coalitions that face growing resistance can become vulnerable 
authoritarianisms and so on (Khan 2010). 
 
The configuration of political power in Nepal has changed dramatically since the 1950s. In 
the Sections 4 and 5, we will map these changes using the framework outlined in Box 1.  
 
Characteristics of business organizations  
 
The implementation of economic policies depends not only on the configuration of political 
power but also on the configuration of economic power and capabilities. An important 
reason why policies to support the emergence of competitive firms fails in developing 
countries is that business-government relationships often result in rents being 
unproductively captured rather than being used to raise productivity and learning. The role 
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of productive capabilities of firms and their power relative to political organizations is 
summarized in Box 2. High capability firms are ones that are already globally competitive or 
are close to having the capability of achieving competitiveness. Low capability firms are 
poorly organized and lack effective organizations, and are likely to need rents on a more 
permanent basis to survive.  Firms with high holding power can hold out for rents by 
mobilizing their own networks of power such as links with individual politicians. Those with 
low holding power are easier to discipline (if the political coalition is developmental), but 
also easier to expropriate (if the political coalition has short-term rent capture motives). 
These interdependencies can make simplistic prognoses about rent management prospects 
very misleading.  
 
Box 2 Economic Organizations and Political Settlements 
 
 
Source: Based on Khan (2010), Figure 18  
The development states of East Asia not only had a configuration of political power that was 
in the top left corner in Box 1, but also high-capability firms that were relatively weak in 
their bargaining power with the ruling coalition, located in the bottom left in the box above. 
This political settlement allowed the ruling coalition to allocate rents to high-capability firms 
and then enforce conditions on them to ensure that productivity and competitiveness 
increased. A more adverse combination is to have political organizations in a competitive 
clientelist configuration (bottom right hand of Box 1) facing firms that are low capability but 
powerful (top right in box above). Here the probability of rents being captured by powerful 
but low capability firms is very high and the capability of policy-makers to discipline them is 
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low. The challenge in countries like Nepal is that the political settlement is close to this 
configuration and designing policies to drive capability development and inclusive growth 
are correspondingly more challenging. A more promising group of firms in Nepal are the 
lower-capability but also politically weak firms in the SME sector (bottom right hand 
quadrant) where there is a better chance of providing a combination of rents and effective 
market and state disciplining to raise productivity and achieve sustainable growth.  
 
The configuration of power across businesses in Nepal has not changed quite so 
dramatically over time. Business in Nepal is dominated by a few large diversified 
conglomerates and most of them have relatively low productive capabilities compared to 
their competitors in the region. Apart from the big players, there are many smaller firms 
with much lower competitive capabilities and with little social and economic power. Over 
ninety percent of employment is in the informal sector, which roughly corresponds to the 
smaller firms. The large conglomerates are important because they are active in the modern 
economy and have the potential capability of increasing modern high-value adding 
economic activities and employment opportunities. Their limited productive capabilities are 
indicated by the fact that many of the larger conglomerates are primarily engaged in trading 
activities or engaged as ‘agencies’ for foreign firms.  
Their manufacturing competitiveness and capabilities are relatively low compared to their 
regional competitors and this is demonstrated by their low levels of exports. A few, 
however, are indeed competitive (Lamsal and Sharma 2016). As we saw earlier, the share of 
the manufacturing sector has declined from around 15 percent in the protected market 
before liberalization to only around 5 percent now, suggesting that the firms that were 
being developed with protection and subsidies largely failed to acquire competitiveness.  
These observations locate most large firms in Nepal in the top right hand quadrant in Box 2. 
They had, and continue to have, relatively low productive capabilities but are connected to 
powerful politicians and have enough holding power to resist disciplining. It is not surprising 
that they were mainly involved in activities that gave them access to easy rents with little 
compulsion to raise their competitiveness. Prior to India’s liberalization in the 1990s, one of 
the main business activities was importing products that faced high tariffs in India and re-
exporting them to capture easy rents. This was encouraged by the government as a means 
of revenue generation. These opportunities provided businesses with profits based on rent 
capture while investments in manufacturing capabilities remained limited (Dhakal and 
Subedi 2006).  The smaller and more numerous firms in Nepal are located in the bottom 
right hand quadrant in Box 2. 
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Our analysis of business-government relationships focuses on the capabilities of firms and 
the distribution of power rather than the sector they are in. The sector in which a firm is 
operating is less important. For instance, a firm could be in the export-oriented garments 
industry but in our analysis it may not be a ‘magician’ firm as defined by Pritchett and 
Werker, with sustainable global competitiveness, even if it was actually exporting in 
competitive markets (Pritchett and Werker 2012). If the firm was politically powerful and 
located in a competitive clientelist political settlement, it may find it possible to export by 
capturing unproductive rents, for instance by not repaying bank loans or relying on hidden 
or explicit subsidies, rather than using these rents to raise its productivity to become truly 
competitive. This is particularly important in Nepal (and many other developing countries), 
where many export-oriented firms are actually not competitive and rely on permanent 
supplies of rents. Many export-oriented garments factories in Nepal that emerged when 
there were MFA rents in the 1980s and 1990s disappeared quickly when MFA was phased 
out, demonstrating that their export prowess was based on access to rents.  
Equally, if political organizations have high enforcement capabilities and domestic firms 
have high productive capabilities and are not very powerful, rent allocations to firms in 
domestic non-tradable sectors, the ‘powerbrokers’ in Pritchett and Werker’s language, 
could be very efficient and achieve rapid productivity growth. This is often the case with 
construction companies or public sector providers in developmental states like Taiwan or 
China. The reality is that firms in all sectors in developing countries need to have access to 
policy support and therefore to rents (but for different reasons), and the outcomes in every 
case depend on how these rents are managed. The implication is that policy design to 
support productivity growth needs to take into account the features of the political 
settlement outlined in our Box 1 and Box 2, and focus less on the type of sector the firm is 
operating in, though that can clearly matter as well.  
 
4. Rents and the Challenge of Inclusive Growth in Nepal 
• The configuration of organizational power in Nepal has changed dramatically since 
the 1990s  
• The intermediate classes have become stronger, particularly since 2006 
• Large firms are mostly uncompetitive and share a collusive relationship with political 
organizations 
• Opportunities exist to develop an SME-based entrepreneurial class particularly by 
leveraging opportunities created by the growing strength of the intermediate classes 
The political settlement approach allows us to look at the challenges of effectively managing 
any policy induced rents. However, we will focus on a particular policy challenge, before 
turning to how the political settlement and the presence of a range of other rents in Nepal 
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affect the achievement of this central policy challenge. A necessary requirement for 
sustaining inclusive growth in Nepal is that the country must be able to develop competitive 
productive sectors that are able to generate large numbers of jobs. In common with many 
developing countries, in our assessment the binding constraint in Nepal is the absence of 
large numbers of potential firms that can rapidly become globally competitive with small 
changes in prices and opportunities. If this constraint cannot be overcome, attempting to 
improve other constraints may provide disappointing results.  
The openness of Nepal’s borders with India and India’s greater competitiveness in 
manufacturing, revealed by the magnitude of the trade imbalance, create a serious 
challenge for Nepal’s policy-makers attempting to develop its own employment-generating 
economic activities. If its own economic activities in particular sectors are not yet 
competitive enough (with a high enough productivity and product quality given wage 
differentials with competing countries) then policy has to assist the development of these 
competitive capabilities. The policy challenge is to identify and then to provide support for 
domestic industries to develop competitiveness in potentially feasible sectors. Without the 
development of a large number of competitive firms in these sectors, particularly those 
using labour-intensive technologies, it will not be possible to provide extensive employment 
opportunities in Nepal. Potentially feasible sectors are not particularly difficult to identify. 
They are sectors where there is already some activity, and where the competitiveness gap 
defined as the gap between the current productivity and quality levels of Nepali firms and 
the levels they would have to achieve to become globally competitive is feasible to address 
using learning-by-doing and skills upgrading strategies (Khan 2013b). We will later discuss 
some of these potential sectors in Nepal. However, identifying these potential sectors is 
relatively easy compared to the challenge of devising effective policies to upgrade their 
competitiveness.  
The support that is required for firms to enable them to improve their productivity and 
product quality to narrow the competitiveness gap generates rents for these firms. These 
are potentially useful rents, provided they can be managed properly. This means they have 
to be targeted to the right firms, the performance of the firms has to be monitored, and 
support has to be withdrawn if performance remains poor. If firms know this will happen 
they will put in high levels of effort, and the failure rate will be low (Khan 2000a, 2013b). 
Managing these rents has not been easy in most countries, and Nepal is no exception. 
Policy-makers will have to devise strategies to support this upgrading that will work in the 
Nepali context. This policy challenge is further complicated by the presence of other 
important rents that powerful firms are already capturing. We will discuss these in a later 
section. These rents also make the management of policy rents for accelerating inclusive 
growth challenging because they distort the incentives of firms.  
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Parallel to the evolving story of policy rents in Nepal, there have been rapid changes in the 
organizational structure of Nepali society, which in turn affects the prospects of effectively 
managing different types of rents. Despite its enormous diversity, for a long time economic 
and political power had remained concentrated in a relatively narrow range of organizations 
and social groups in the Kathmandu region. This is particularly remarkable given the 
complex social structure of Nepal, its regional and ethnic diversity, and the economic and 
social differences across its many micro-communities. Indeed, any simplified description of 
the Nepali political settlement always has to come with the caveat that this diversity needs 
to be factored in.  But we can safely make the generalization that the concentration of 
organizational power that characterized Nepal till very recently was not very sustainable. 
The close connections between a relatively small number of powerful economic and political 
organizations in Kathmandu meant that developmental rents could not be effectively 
disciplined, and political rents were too narrowly distributed to sustain political stability.  
However, the Nepali political settlement went through dramatic changes as a result of 
successive mobilizations for democracy that eventually led to the ten-year Maoist 
insurgency from 1996. Even though the insurgency appears to have ended with a return to 
politics as usual, our assessment is that there has been a significant rupture that cannot be 
ignored in the longer run. The insurgency mobilized groups that had previously been 
entirely outside the political mainstream in Nepal, and it thereby demonstrated the 
potential organizational capabilities of different groups in the country. This is likely to have 
permanently changed the political dynamics of Nepal. In our assessment, the change in the 
political settlement is very significant and belies the perception that nothing much has 
changed in the politics of Nepal. In particular, Nepal is likely to see more significant 
mobilizations of the intermediate classes in the future and this will force institutions to 
support a more decentralized pattern of rent allocation, in line with other parts of the 
Indian subcontinent where intermediate class politics has been dominant for a much longer.  
The intermediate classes refer to social groups that are neither surplus-consuming classes, 
like capitalists and large landlords, whose claim on the economic surplus is their primary 
source of income, nor groups whose income from labour constitutes their main source of 
income, like workers and landless peasants. The intermediate classes are in-between these 
two strata: their incomes come partly from labour, partly from access to capital, including 
human capital, but significantly, they have potentially important organizational capabilities 
in the typical developing country context. These groups constitute the middle thirty to forty 
percent of South Asian societies. It would be wrong to call them ‘middle class’ because 
many of their members are quite poor in absolute terms, and they are also distinct from 
middle classes in advanced countries in that their upward mobility often depends quite 
significantly on their success in political mobilization and the capture of political rents. The 
significance of these groups was pointed out by Kalecki, Chatterjee, Washbrook, Khan and 
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others, in the context of the organization of politics in South Asia (Kalecki 1976; Washbrook 
1981; Chatterjee 1997; Khan 2000b).  
The deepening of democratic processes in South Asia benefited the intermediate classes 
because they soon came to achieve a pivotal position in political organizations. Capitalists 
and landlords were richer but too few in number, and they did not generate enough surplus 
to dominate the entire national political process. Workers, peasants and other subaltern 
groups were more numerous than intermediate classes but they were too poor and too 
busy making a living to be able to effectively organize. In contrast, the intermediate classes, 
a varying mix of middle peasants, petty bourgeoisie, professionals like village school 
teachers, urban small-town lawyers, the educated unemployed and others, whose 
composition would vary from region to region, always played a significant role in the 
organization of politics. Any investigation of who the dominant players are in most political 
parties in the Indian subcontinent shows that the bulk of their organizational capacity 
comes from enterprising members of these classes. They are the most capable in mobilizing 
large numbers of others through different variants of patron-client politics. In turn, patron-
client politics led by the intermediate classes has been a major mechanism for the capture 
of informal ‘political’ rents that are then distributed through these networks to satisfy 
clients and to sustain the organizational power of the network.  
An immediate indication of the direction of travel in Nepal has been the evolution of the 
new constitution and the federal structure. These institutional changes were set in motion 
by the Maoists but it is clear that the Maoist-led mobilization has now been normalised into 
a more decentralized pattern of rent allocation, ostensibly in response to the steadily 
growing mobilization by intermediate class organizers of new groups lower down the social 
hierarchy. This has been very good for reducing the space for violent mobilizations by 
excluded poorer layers of society in the future, though other, regional and ethnic fissures 
like the demands of the Madhesis and the Tharus remain. However, even they are now 
fighting for their rights and rents through elections contested by parties organized by their 
own intermediate class political entrepreneurs. The long insurgency thus created the space 
for a gradual emergence of a relatively more inclusive political rent allocation as the relative 
power of the intermediate classes within political organizations increased. The sustainability 
of these institutional changes will depend on whether the rent allocation to new segments 
of Nepali society can be matched with the creation of new productive capabilities across 
regions in ways that benefit the upwardly mobile intermediate classes. Otherwise, the 
growing demand for rents for newly mobilizing groups may not be sustainable and may 
result in zero-sum conflicts that can eventually become very intense. On the other hand, the 
mobilization of these new groups also creates opportunities for allocating rents that can be 
disciplined to achieve developmental objectives. Emerging entrepreneurs from within the 
intermediate classes may be induced to set up SMEs. Many may initially be relatively weak 
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in terms of the holding power against national politicians and bureaucrats, creating 
opportunities to use policies and institutions to allocate capability-enhancing rents to them 
in ways that can be linked to performance and withdrawn if necessary. If this can be 
achieved, and the new rent-recipients can be disciplined or incentivized to achieve 
competitiveness, Nepal may be able to enter a virtuous cycle of growth and political 
inclusion that would be sustainable over time.  
The bureaucracy in Nepal is also an important part of the organizational structure that 
determines the implementation success of particular institutions and policies. Given the 
complexities of Nepal, simple generalisations can be misleading, but it is safe to say that 
senior levels of the bureaucracy are highly politicised and bureaucrats are part of political 
patronage networks that make reform in critical sectors difficult. Ministers as well as 
bureaucrats have incentives not to increase efficiency in various government agencies and 
departments if this affects their own established mechanisms of rent capture, whether 
through procurement processes or informal kickbacks. The energy sector is an example 
where this feature of bureaucratic and political collusion is holding up reform in the Nepal 
Electricity Authority (Rai and Neupane 2017).  
While the informal collusion between bureaucrats and politicians is common across 
developing countries and South Asia, it appears that officials in the Nepali bureaucracy 
behave in a somewhat more fragmented way relative to many parts of South Asia. Some of 
our informants suggest that Nepali bureaucrats become part of patronage networks at an 
early stage of their careers in order to be promoted to senior positions (despite entry being 
through a competitive exam) and their primary allegiance is to particular political leaders. 
This reflected to some extent the weak organization of parties in Nepal in the past, and 
therefore the greater importance of very personalized networks. If the allegiance of the 
senior bureaucrat is to a particular politician, their freedom of operation can be much more 
constrained. Deals with businesses are more likely to involve very immediate sharing of 
damaging short term rents, for instance captured through collusion over inflated contracts 
or by setting up monopolies rather than potentially more dynamic conditional rent 
allocations to raise productivity and share benefits over time. High levels of bureaucratic 
fragmentation can therefore have negative implications for rent management in the same 
way as the political fragmentation in competitive clientelism creates short time horizons and 
poor enforcement capabilities. 
The configuration of power between political and economic organizations has a bearing on 
the political settlement. Similarly the configuration of power across political organizations 
has an important effect on the organization and capabilities of bureaucratic agencies. The 
evidence shows that there are some agencies that have in recent times performed well 
under senior bureaucrats like the current head of Nepal Electricity Authority. But good 
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results are typically based on discretionary actions by strong bureaucratic leaders who have 
political support rather than as a result of well-working bureaucratic institutions. In most 
areas of the bureaucracy opposition to increased transparency is high, and even within the 
electricity sector there is strong opposition to any transfer of responsibility to a proposed 
regulatory body (Rai and Neupane 2017). There is also anecdotal evidence of a ’10 per cent’ 
rule in Nepal in sectors like local development, irrigation and energy where resources are 
captured and channelled up to ministries with the relevant bureaucracies acting as conduits. 
This suggests the bureaucracy in Nepal is constrained by the political parties and in effect 
work with them, and sometimes for them, to capture rents.  
Political parties can directly constrain the bureaucracy as was seen in 2015 when the 
Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) had some of its powers 
curtailed. Its authority as an ombudsman was taken away and was only allowed prosecuting 
functions. This was because politicians had earlier been negatively affected by the CIAA’s 
investigations as an ombudsman. One of the specific features of the configuration of power 
in Nepal is that senior bureaucrats owe allegiance to individual party leaders or at best 
factions within parties. This makes the bureaucracy highly fragmented as well as curtailing 
implementation capacity. However this would be a bigger difficulty for more ambitious rule 
of law reforms (as with the case of the CIAA) while the implementation of smaller sector-
specific reforms of the type we propose may not be seriously affected. Finding sectoral 
‘champions’ within bureaucracies could be also one way of ensuring better policy uptake 
and implementation.  
Finally, the factors supporting damaging rent creation in Nepal include the limited 
development and low capabilities of the Nepali business sector. This is one reason why 
Nepal achieved low growth even after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006. The 
period of democracy that began in the 1990s did provide some economic organisations the 
political stability to make longer term investments and created some incentives for 
productivity growth. The insurgency and the negotiations that ended it created stronger 
political parties. So far, a dynamic pattern of rent creation and allocation between political 
and economic organizations has not emerged and the challenge for policy is to identify 
interventions that can nudge rent management in more productive directions that are 
feasible within the evolving political settlement. 
An important message of our analysis is that recent changes in the distribution of 
organizational power have created both challenges and opportunities for future rent-
allocation strategies for sustaining inclusive growth. The challenge for political stability is 
that political institutions have to evolve to allocate political rents more effectively through 
decentralized political institutions. This is necessary to provide rents to emergent power 
groups where intermediate socio-economic classes and a broader range of regions are likely 
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to play a more prominent role. The economic opportunity is that these classes and regions 
can also provide potential entrepreneurs who can set up SMEs in low-technology labour-
intensive sectors that can achieve competitiveness in sectors like food and beverages, 
garments and textiles, manufacturing simple components for domestic industries and 
construction, a diversified tourist industry and so on, which could herald a new inclusive 
growth strategy. This would require thinking through ways of delivering rents for achieving 
economic outcomes in ways that are less likely to be wasted or captured. A number of 
strategies for developing SMEs in new sectors may be feasible, particularly by taking 
advantage of changes in the political settlement that may allow a broader range of firms to 
be targeted, and which may be easier to discipline. The experiences of Bangladesh and 
other countries provide pointers, but like other countries, Nepal will have to experiment and 
innovate on its own developmental institutions and policies.  
 
5. Phases in the Evolution of Nepal’s Political Settlement  
In this section we map major changes in the configuration of power in Nepal. While the 
changes in the organizational capabilities of economic organizations have changed relatively 
slowly, political change has been rapid and dramatic in Nepal. We argue that the insurgency 
of 1996 and the peace that subsequently emerged in 2008 represents a significant break 
with previous political settlements. In particular, some future trajectories are potentially 
very promising for developmental rent management. Using the framework outlined in Box 
1, the narrative that follows is summarized in Figure 4. 
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Source: Authors 
Figure 4 Evolution of the Political Settlement in Nepal 
 
The Rana Period –1950 
Our mapping begins with the Rana period that lasted till 1950. The contours of modern 
Nepal, in terms of its national identity were formed in the latter half of the 18th century 
during the reign of Prithvi Narayan Shah. Territories were unified and systems of land 
taxation were introduced. A rigid social structure based on the non-inclusive Hindu caste 
system was introduced. These patterns intensified under the period of Rana rule that began 
around a hundred years later and led to the creation of a Nepali consciousness, even though 
it was exclusionary and absolutist in nature. The caste system was rigidly followed and the 
upper castes of Brahman and Kshatriya (Bahun and Chettri in Nepal respectively) were the 
most privileged. While the years under the rule of the Shah dynasty were characterised by 
wars with the British and even the Chinese, the subsequent period of Rana rule witnessed 
close co-operation with the British which ensured that Nepal was never colonised unlike the 
rest of South Asia. 
Excluded political organizations were weakly organized and the near feudal state structure 
had control over lower levels of the ruling coalition. This political settlement had very 
limited political access to power for excluded groups but the latter were very weakly 
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organized. Thus, while the state had aspects of authoritarianism, opposition was low, and 
the political settlement therefore had some characteristics that resembled a developmental 
state (for instance the Ranas built the first hydel power plant in Nepal in 1911, one of the 
first in Asia). However, the Rana state achieved weak developmental outcomes because 
economic organizations (firms) in Nepal prior to the 1950s (and even today) had relatively 
low capabilities (discussed in Box 2). The few firms that were there in Nepal during the Rana 
period had low capabilities and were closely connected to political networks and could not 
be effectively disciplined. The Rana state could not have directed productivity-enhancing 
rents to such firms to attempt to achieve productivity growth. 
 
The Democratic Period 1950-59 
The period of Rana rule came to an end in 1950 when a popular uprising supported by India 
secured the return of the monarch, King Tribhuvan, and the Nepali Congress (NC), the oldest 
extant political party in Nepal, while maintaining a diminished Rana representation. This 
marked the beginning of India’s not-so-covert involvement in the domestic politics of Nepal 
in order to keep the Chinese at bay in the background of the invasion of Tibet. The NC 
gained a two-thirds majority in parliament in 1959. In Figure 4 we show the change in terms 
of excluded groups becoming more powerful over time. Repression alone was unable to 
maintain the Rana political settlement, as the popular uprising demonstrated. The political 
parties were still very centralized and controlled by upper caste elites, and the opposition 
was very weak. So the movement to the right was not very great. The control of the ruling 
coalition over its lower levels was also likely to have been somewhat weaker than under the 
more cohesive Rana rule. This type of democracy could have been developmental, but once 
again, the low capabilities and political connections of the nascent Nepali business sector 
help to explain why developmental outcomes did not accelerate.  
 
The Panchayat Monarchy 1960-90 
A coup by Tribhuvan’s successor King Mahendra in 1960 led to another significant rupture 
and the suspension of democracy. In its place came a party-less ‘Panchayat’ system (the 
system of micro-devolved local governance prevalent in much of Northern South Asia) but 
with the monarchy exercising most powers. This was a move towards vulnerable 
authoritarianism in Figure 4. Ironically, excluded groups had in the meantime become more 
assertive so this political settlement was further to the right compared to the Rana period, 
and excluded groups were managed with a combination of limited inclusion through the 
panchayati system but also repression and restrictions on political activity. The Panchayati 
system had limited developmental characteristics, but King Mahendra was able to 
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implement some development programmes including building a road link between East and 
West Nepal and he attempted some land reforms. But the vulnerable authoritarian political 
settlement was not used to direct rents for the development of new economic organizations 
and the King ensured that he was the only power centre.  
This system achieved some improvements in indicators like education but economic growth 
remained poor (Robinson 2007). Mahendra started the civil service and laid the foundations 
of the modern Nepali state. Mahendra’s reign however has been described as ‘ethnically 
hegemonic’ because it upheld the primacy of upper caste hill culture in Nepal (Shakya 2011). 
This partyless Panvhayat system was used to cement a Nepali identity based on Hinduism 
and the Nepali language, ignoring the diversity and complexity of the Nepali nation. A 
comprehensive outline of this period is available in Baral (Baral 2012). This period is seen by 
many analysts as having laid the foundations of Nepal’s development trajectory because of 
some of the steps described above. 
 
Multi-Party Democracy 1990-96 
The next move was again a significant one. Multi-party democracy was restored in 1990 
through a Jan Andolan or mass movement. The aspirations of excluded groups had been 
growing during the Panchayati period despite restrictions and repression. The party-less 
panchayat system was a cover for monarchical rule that sustained the power of a narrow 
range of upper castes by enforcing strict restrictions on political activity. The Jan Andolan 
forced King Birendra, Mahendra’s successor to hand over power and make Nepal a 
constitutional monarchy in 1990. The Nepal Congress, NC, emerged victorious in the first 
parliamentary elections in 1991 and the left-wing CPN-UML formed the government after 
the mid-term elections in 1994 (despite a hung parliament). The new phase of multi-party 
democracy lasted from 1990 to 1996. This phase was disrupted by the outbreak of the 
Maoist-led insurgency that mobilized entirely new groups and regions in Nepal to provide 
the most significant challenge to the established order.  
The new political settlement was more clearly a competitive clientelist one in Figure 4. 
Parties had gradually become somewhat more inclusive. Their lower-level membership and 
the constituencies they mobilized were somewhat more assertive than before. This meant 
that the control exercised by higher levels over lower levels was likely to be diminishing. 
There were more parties as well by now, and the ones that were excluded from power at 
any time were now stronger than before. However, the introduction of democracy meant 
that repression against currently excluded political organizations was much lower level as 
excluded groups that were represented by or organized in parties could wait for elections 
instead of directly challenging the ruling coalition. However, as the insurgency 
demonstrated, not all groups were getting access to power and rents through the 
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democratic process. Democracy therefore had complex effects. On the one hand it arguably 
reduced the enforcement capabilities of ruling coalitions but on the other hand, it sustained 
greater political stability and required less repression. We know from Table 1 that the 
period from 1990 to 2000 witnessed some of the highest growth rates in Nepal, and the 
political stability that democracy promised probably contributed to sustain this growth.  
 
Insurgency and Monarchy 1996-2006 
This period of democracy was also short-lived. The next shift happened around 1996 as the 
Maoists began to mobilize some of the very large numbers of people in Nepal who were still 
excluded from power and rents. The immediate effect was a centralization of power in the 
monarchy and a return to greater authoritarianism and repression. This was a further move 
to the right in Figure 4 as excluded groups were now even more powerful, indeed they were 
engaged in an armed insurgency and repression increased dramatically. However, moves to 
centralize power also faced more pushback from mainstream parties compared to earlier 
periods of authoritarianism. While not opposing the monarchy outright, political parties 
were wary of the growth in royal power. This was clearly not a good period for 
development, and the major concern for most people was to end the conflict on reasonable 
terms. The conflict ended with a military stalemate after ten years of fighting. It was clear 
that a military victory was unlikely for either side. This created the grounds for the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and in a dramatic turn of events, the Maoists decided 
to lay down their arms and join mainstream politics by contesting the elections.  
 
Democracy with Maoist Inclusion 2008– 
A rupture between the mainstream political parties and the monarchy allowed elections in 
2008 that included the Maoists and brought them into the mainstream. The new democracy 
was therefore much more inclusive than previous variants as new constituencies organized 
in parties were now in play. The new political settlement was a competitive clientelist one. 
There was a shift to the left in Figure 4 as excluded groups were now weaker, meaning that 
a significant number of powerful groups could enter the ruling coalition and those waiting in 
the wings were not necessarily permanently excluded and had little incentive to revert to 
violence. Repression could decline dramatically as a result. Parties now mobilized wider 
constituencies and there was more intense party competition. There was potentially greater 
stability but parties now included more organizers and responded to wider constituencies, 
so it was more difficult to discipline themselves and achieve high implementation success. 
So we also have a movement downwards in Figure 4, making the new political settlement a 
competitive clientelist one.   
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While the transitions from forms of democracy to forms of authoritarianism (though less so 
from the turn of this century) in Nepal appear to be messy and baffling, it is worth pointing 
out that very few developing countries have been able to make the transition that Nepal has 
made from authoritarian rule and a violent insurgency to peace-building and constitution-
making that has radically shifted the political discourse. The insurgency brought into the 
mainstream a discourse of political and social inclusion that was substantial and not just 
formal. The instability that the country has been through is the result of the social churn 
after years of mobilisations that came to a head in 1990, reaching new peaks during the 
insurgency years. The insurgency ruptured many established power structures and created a 
space for the emergence of a relatively more inclusive society. This, along with technological 
penetration and a young population has ensured real pressures for a redistribution of power 
and rents despite the complacency created by the remittance economy. Nepal's success in 
pushing through significant changes like a secular constitution and commitment to a federal 
structure have reflected changes in the distribution of power. Despite persistent attempts 
to push back by groups whose dominance is threatened, a return to the status quo ante is 
quite unlikely. The 2015 Constitution promises to further devolve power and decentralize 
the political institutions through which rents are allocated. 
A number of political parties have gradually emerged and consolidated in Nepal, including 
the right of centre, monarchy-supporting Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) which had split 
initially and has since reunited, the regionally based Nepal Worker’s and Peasant’s Party, an 
offshoot of the CPN formed in 1949 in India, and the Nepal Sadbhavna Party (NSP) that 
emerged to represent the interests of the Madhesi community in the Terai region of the 
country. This was the precursor to the Madhesi parties that now represent the region in 
elections. To this list was added the CPN-Maosists in 2006 when they laid down arms under 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and agreed to join multi-party politics. After having 
gained the maximum number of seats in 2008, by 2017 they were reduced to the third 
largest party after the NC and CPN-UML but they nonetheless remain a formidable force in 
mainstream Nepali politics and especially in their stronghold of the Western Terai. While 
there remain three main political parties (the NC, the Maoists and the UML) who together 
hold close to 90 percent of the seats in the current parliament others like the RPP and 
ideological descendants of the NSP like the Rashtriya Janata Party and Sanghiya Samajbadi 
Forum-Nepal have emerged as smaller players who could play an important role in coalition 
politics. The RPP gained a significant number of seats in the 1990s and has seen somewhat 
of a resurgence since. The Madhesi parties will also be testing their strength in future 
provincial and federal elections after having come second and third in the local elections in 
Province 2, an area of much contestation between the Madhesi movement and the larger 
political parties, especially the UML.  
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A significant feature of politics in Nepal after 1990 has been the importance of coalition 
politics and frequent changes in government. Apart from the Worker’s and Peasant’s Party, 
most parties, even those winning a few seats in parliament, have been part of the 
government at one time or another. This has also meant that parties from across the 
ideological spectrum have been forced to work together in order to keep governments 
running, at least for short periods. An understanding of the political settlement and the 
limited organizational opportunities for parties in the past allows us to understand this 
better. Parties in Nepal did not have the opportunity to develop their organizational 
structures over long periods of peaceful political competition. If they had, they would have 
been driven to mobilize and include intermediate class organizers at lower levels and 
develop distinct constituencies in the way parties elsewhere in South Asia have done over 
decades. As a result, even when parties won seats in Nepali elections, their holding power 
against other elites in other parties was low, and elite bargaining could change governments 
at the top without much reference to party organizations. As parties become more 
developed in the emergent political settlement, they are likely to develop their formal and 
informal organizational structures. In the future, the relative holding power of different 
parties will be much clearer and bargaining at the top will be less likely to change 
governments so easily.  
In some respects, the fluidity at the top has been fortunate for Nepal in allowing deals to be 
made between leaders of competing parties at a time of intense conflict. The most effective 
example of coalition politics was the 12 point agreement between the Seven Party Alliance 
and the Maoists in 2005. The background to this was that between 2002 and 2005 during 
the insurgency, the mainstream parties were in favour of a constitutional monarchy (with 
Gyanendra as the reigning monarch after the assassination of Birendra). The Maoists were 
fighting the monarchy. However, the mainstream parties were compelled to abandon their 
position when Gyanendra sought to centralize power in his hands in 2005. This was the start 
of a second Jana Andolan that paved the way for the Maoists to push through their 
republican agenda and their demand for a constituent assembly in return for accepting a 
role within parliamentary democracy (Hacchethu 2006). The new discourse on inclusion and 
secularism that is reflected in the constitution of 2015 is therefore ultimately the result of 
the decade-long Maoist insurgency, even though there is some way to go for these changes 
to be institutionalized and fully implemented.  
However, the still weak organizational capabilities of the main parties in Nepal can constrain 
the institutionalization of inclusive politics in Nepal. Most major Nepali political parties 
started life as underground movements and organizations and hence while being relatively 
well organised in some respects (the NC is the weakest of the three) they also tend to be 
heavily centralised (Hacchethu 2006). Like political parties in other developing countries, 
Nepali parties are primarily coalitions of informal and personalized networks linking 
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powerful political organizers to their supporters through networks of patronage. But the 
role of intermediate class organizers within these parties appear to be relatively less 
developed compared to other South Asian neighbours. For instance, the parties still 
continue to be dominated by Brahmins and Chettris despite two of the main parties being 
avowedly Communist. This is also a feature of Left parties in neighbouring India and reflects 
the fact that the educated traditionally come from higher castes. However, after years of 
political competition, lower castes play critical roles as powerful organizers in all parties in 
India and have led many parties and state governments. This is very likely to gradually 
happen in Nepal. Indeed Nepal has its own history of local collective action and 
mobilisation, for instance through the Forest User Groups, and more recently benefit 
sharing in hydel projects. Mobilising disaffected groups has clearly become relatively easier 
over time (Chapagain and Sanio 2012). The diverse social groups who have gradually 
become mobilized present challenges to the mainstream political parties if they attempt to 
restrict their rent allocation strategies to upper caste clients to too great an extent, 
including the Madhehsi parties (Prasai 2007). 
One reason for the extreme political instability that we see is due to the intensely 
factionalised nature of Nepali political parties. All major political parties have two, or 
sometimes, even three power centres and the conflict between them is often the reason 
why governments change so rapidly. This in turn reflects the weak institutionalization of 
power relationships within parties, and the relatively limited role of organizers within 
parties in mobilizing supporters, reflecting the fact that parties have largely operated in 
semi-underground conditions. Factionalism and infighting have been particularly 
characteristic of Nepali Communist movements. This highly factionalised politics leads to 
governments, or factions in power, having a short political horizon, affecting their strategies 
of rent capture. Governments or the factions forming governments have internalised that 
their tenure is likely to be short as other factions (and opposition parties sensing 
opportunity to destabilise governments) mobilise.  
Till party organizational structures become stronger, intra-party factions in Nepali parties 
are likely to be more fluid and local rent distribution conflicts within ruling elites can result 
in coalitions breaking down rapidly (Hacchethu 2006). Instability and contestation are also 
driven by the fact that the current electoral system uses a combination of first-past-the-post 
and proportional representation (PR), which gives party leaders considerable leeway in 
drawing up the list for the PR voting. This can result in candidates being dependent on 
individual party leaders and serving their narrow political interests rather than representing 
and responding to their voters (Asian Development Bank 2012).  
The weak organizational capabilities of parties in Nepal means that deals between leaders 
are not based on rent-sharing arrangements between organizations to the same extent as 
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most of South Asia. Deals can happen quickly, and can be reversed equally quickly. Informal 
agreements between parties are important in all developing countries but their 
sustainability depends on whether the leaders actually represent the interests of the 
underlying organizations. For instance, in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, informal rent 
sharing arrangements between competing political parties allowed long-term investments 
to be made in the 1980s and 1990s as investors knew that rival parties had the 
organizational structures to make deals stick (and that enough people would benefit within 
the parties to make this happen). As a result, investors were confident they would not be 
hurt when power changed (Roy 2013). This is because the Tamil parties have powerful 
networks of organizers within them, and the deals gave significant benefits to large sections 
within both parties. However these deep organizational structures appear not to have yet 
emerged in Nepal. As a result, deals between leaders of current Nepali political parties are 
less stable because they are not based on agreements both within and between powerful 
and relatively structured organizations. Secondly, of course, Nepal does not yet have 
enough productive firms that could have created pressure on politicians to reach informal 
agreements to share rents and agree on common policies and institutions to sustain long-
run growth.  
 
6. Regional Geo-Politics and Nepal’s Political Settlement  
• Nepal’s geo-strategic position between China and India more a hindrance than an 
advantage 
• Indian intervention has of late been high handed, for instance the blockade 
• China has stepped up investments and influencing activities  
• India-China competition will have significant impact on Nepal but the challenge for 
Nepal is to ensure this is a positive impact  
Nepal occupies a geographical position that is somewhat unique. While there are many 
landlocked countries few have are in a situation where their immediate and only neighbours 
are rising competing powers like India and China—one already a superpower, the other a 
regional power. This puts Nepal in the position of having to navigate two powerful 
neighbours with diverging and conflicting geo-strategic interests, and this has a direct effect 
on the Nepali political settlement. Historically India’s involvement with Nepal has been 
closer than China’s and the former considers Nepal its bailiwick. Nepalis are allowed to 
freely work and reside in India and even serve in the Indian army. However the faster rise of 
China and its obvious dominance globally and India’s attempts to micromanage Nepal have 
changed important elements of this relationship.  
China’s competition in the region, including in Nepal, elicits reactions from India which are 
not always predictable. Coupled with this is the fact that just as China under Xi Jinping is 
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moving towards a more authoritarian strategy of control and a more robust foreign policy, 
moves in a similar direction are also happening within India under the right wing Bharatiya 
Janata Party. The BJP’s Hindutva ideology has already deeply affected politics in India and 
has found resonance in small but potentially influential sections of the Nepali upper caste 
elite, including some leaders in the NC. The UML too would not want to completely alienate 
this constituency. Only the Maosists have rejected Hindutva openly. Sections of the RPP 
leadership with their support for the monarchy and a Hindu Nepali state are openly 
sympathetic to the BJP’s ideology. What is new and therefore unpredictable in the Nepali-
Indian dynamics now is the role Hindutva can play in Nepali politics. Indian interference in 
Nepal has always been high but never has an attempt been made by an Indian ruling 
coalition to frame its involvement using Hindutva ideology. Interestingly it seems the 
Chinese are also backing the Communist parties in Nepal now as they feel these parties will 
be more ideologically sympathetic to ‘Communist’ China. 
Nepal has become more important for the two countries because of the threats they 
perceive from each other. India sees Chinese strategies in the region such as the Belt Road 
Initiative (BRI) as an overtly economic but covertly political strategy to encircle it on all 
sides. The Chinese see India’s increasing co-operation with the US as a threat to its position 
in the region though qualitatively and quantitatively US-India co-operation is nowhere close 
to the BRI in its significance. Nepal itself has tried to weigh these relationships by seeing 
India as an ‘erstwhile strategic protector’ and China as a ‘new (and far richer) investor’ (Basu 
2017). Culturally though a sizable portion of the Nepali population shares closer ties with 
India than with any other country in the region and the open borders between the two have 
remained despite other borders closing up in South Asia. 
Historically, there have been close personal relationships between the political leadership of 
Nepal and India, many of whom were classmates in universities. Examples include the case 
of Sitaram Yechury of the Indian Left and Baburam Bhattarai a Nepali Maoist who met as 
students in Delhi. Or ex-Indian prime minister Chandra Shekhar and one of the pioneers of 
the NC, BP Koirala, who met in Varanasi. At different times, NC members were in exile in 
India and senior Maoist leaders got safe passage into India. Shekhar attended the first ever 
meeting of Nepali political parties after multi party democracy was restored in Nepal in 
1990. Yechury along with DP Triptahi, another Indian politician were the interlocutors (not 
always official) on the Indian side negotiating with the Maoists and the NC at the height of 
the insurgency. The two even attended the first session of the reinstated parliament in 
2006. 
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Table 7 Effects of the 2015-16 Blockade 
 
Note: KL are Kilolitres and MT is a metric ton.  
Source: Post Disaster Assessment: Blockade 2015/16, Nepal Economic Forum and Alliance for Social Dialogue: Table 7 
 
This warmth is however firmly in the past now. After 2015, Nepali-Indian ties have slid 
precipitously after India forced a five-and-a-half month long economic blockade on Nepal to 
support Madhesi demands for increased representation focusing around the creation of 
provinces and the demarcation of borders for Province 2. The blockade was costly for Nepal 
as Table 7 shows, with supply lines disrupted and prices of essentials such as petrol shooting 
up. Inflation in the period between September 2015 and February 2016 averaged 12 
percent. This was the third blockade (there were blockades in 1969 and 1989) of Nepal by 
India but anti-Indian sentiment this time round is likely to be sustained for longer given 
growing overtures from China. Nepal’s relationship with India has always been tinged with 
asymmetry, sometimes exploitative and sometimes perceived to be so, but the timing of 
this blockade by Indian leaders could not have come at a worse time for India. The main 
beneficiaries were Indian traders and smugglers, Nepali customs and other officials and 
even some powerful Madhesi political leaders who captured significant rents from informal 
and illicit trade during this period. 
Historically India has been deeply involved in Nepal’s politics, sometimes playing ostensibly 
positive roles as in 1950 (ousting Rana rule), 1990 (reinstating multi-party democracy) and 
2006 (the signing of the CPA). However, there is also plenty of anecdotal evidence to 
suggest India has also been covertly involved in interfering in Nepal’s electoral politics and 
its support for the Madhesi movement has been open. While the blockade laid bare the 
extent of India’s support for the Madhesis at the time (though since then there have been 
reports that the Madhesi parties were nudged to participate in the elections by India) it also 
exposed another weakness in recent Nepali-Indian relations—the lack of pragmatic informal 
back channels, a cornerstone of most successful diplomatic relationships. In the days of 
Yechury or Shekhar this was possible. The Indian politial leadership and both the Nepali elite 
as well as leaders in exile had informal contacts that could be called upon to defuse hostile 
situations. According to quite a few analysts this is no longer the case in the current 
dispensation. Instead, informal backchannels during the blockade included so-called gurus 
or ‘godmen’, not seasoned politicians with foreign policy experience.  
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The changed dynamic in Nepali-Indian relations mirrors the rise of fundamentalist right wing 
politics in India.  The new Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh (UP), Yogi Adityanath, is a hard-
line fundamentalist and former head of a Hindu seminary in Gorakhpur close to the Indian 
border with central Nepal. He is known to have provided active support to the Madhesis. 
The seminary is also linked to the Nepali royal family. There were reports in the Indian 
media that Birendra was a devout follower of Avaidyanath, a mentor of Adityanath and it 
was at the former’s behest that Nepal continued being a Hindu state in the constitution of 
1990 (Chaudhury 2017). Right wing Hindu nationalist organizations like the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a powerful organization espousing Hindu militancy, have long 
been trying to influence politics in the Terai region. While one motivation of this strategy is 
in keeping with the RSS’ incongruous vision of a greater Hindu India beyond its current 
borders, another is to keep in check the ostensibly growing number of madrasas in the Terai 
in Nepal. A more recent target seems to be Christian missionaries in Nepal. The RSS, which 
serves as the ideological fount for the BJP has similar antagonistic relations with the work of 
missionaries in India. The chief ministership of Adityanath has the full support of the RSS in 
UP and is close to the deposed king Gyanendra. Gyanendra has recently made statements to 
the effect that the time has again come for him to provide leadership to Nepal. There has 
always been a section of the population in Nepal who support the restitution of the 
monarchy and of Hinduism as the state religion but since the CPA they have found little 
place in the mainstream. But with ideological Hindutva tailwinds blowing in India, this 
section could become stronger over time. One factor that may block the progress of this 
trend is that the cultural strands of Hinduism prevalent in Nepal, especially among 
indigenous population like the Tharu, are very different from the upper caste version of 
Hindutva. 
The changing dynamic with China is also important as that country is also becoming much 
more involved in Nepali electoral politics. It is already involved in joint military drills and 
organising high profile seminars on politics in the region. This level of involvement is new. 
Recent developments indicate Chinese involvement has gone a step further and moved into 
political territory India considered its own. According to some observers the coming 
together of the Communist parties in the country was at the behest of China which was 
wary of an NC government in the next election. The NC has traditionally been more India-
friendly and the UML has leaned towards China. Earlier the Chinese would work with 
whoever was in power. This signals a shift in China’s strategy in aligning Nepal’s domestic 
politics with its geo-political interests. 
Nepali politicians are not necessarily passive recipients of external attention. They have 
used India as a whipping boy to serve populist sentiments during elections. The same 
politicians have also used Indian support when necessary. After the blockade there is much 
more credibility to their anti-Indian positions. From China’s point of view the electoral 
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arrangement between the UML and the Maoists helps them consolidate a more friendly 
government. Calculations based on numbers from local government elections suggest a pact 
between the UML and the Maoists could work well. And contesting on an anti-
blockade/anti-India platform may also be popular, enabling the Chinese to make use of this 
window. This could make India even warier of encirclement by China and may result in 
concerted attempts to counter Chinese influence with Hindutva as a means of creating new 
pro-Indian coalitions in Nepal. 
The investments and opaque transfers of funds from these competing powers to influence 
Nepali politicians and parties are likely to provide important sources of rents for Nepali 
political organizations over the coming years. Competition based on economic investments 
is likely to benefit Nepal by reducing the cost of capital and accelerating infrastructure 
projects, though they may not always be the best projects or be efficiently executed. Their 
real aim may be to create rent-capture opportunities for political parties in Nepal as a way 
of gaining influence. But more covert flows of finance directly into the political process 
cannot be ruled out. These too are also likely to affect the internal distribution of 
organizational power in Nepal and we are already seeing some indications of this. The 
concern for Nepal is that India’s likely response of pushing Hindutva might have damaging 
long-term consequences. The Hindutva strategy is unlikely to fully succeed in Nepal for the 
reasons mentioned earlier and is also likely to be resisted by a section of the Indian 
bureaucracy that is against aggressive ideological interventions. But nevertheless the China-
India competition could end up creating new instabilities in Nepal. 
 
7. Future scenarios  
• The evolution of the political settlement depends on how power is devolved in the 
coming years  
• We identify two different trajectories in the evolution of the political settlement, one 
based primarily on devolution to local governments, and the other primarily to the 
provinces  
• The nature of rent management and prospects for inclusive growth is likely to depend 
on the trajectory that emerges  
The political settlement approach tells us that substantive changes in institutions (and 
therefore in the rents they allocate) are not possible without matching changes in the 
distribution of power. If the distribution of rents and the distribution of power are not 
matched in sustainable ways, either the formal institutions will be pushed back by counter-
mobilizations, or the formal institutions will be informally modified through corruption and 
clientelism to deliver to the powerful. In Nepal, the social movements of the past decades 
have opened up an opportunity because they challenged the pre-existing distribution of 
power and brought about a recognition across society that institutions should reflect these 
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aspirations by delivering some rents and greater opportunities lower down the social 
pyramid. This opens up the possibility of institutionalizing some of these changes. The 
challenge is to ensure that institutions evolve in ways that consolidate these changes in 
progressive and sustainable ways instead of creating unsustainable rent distributions that 
result in counter-mobilizations.  
Sustainable in this context means that institutions should not only allocate rents to groups 
lower down the social pyramid, they should also help them to become more productive, 
with the capacity to create jobs, so that their claim to rents is soon based on sustainable 
economic power and not just on the more transient voice and power that mass andolans 
have given excluded social groups and their political representatives. Without such a 
sustainable institutional consolidation, the potential for inclusive institutional changes may 
soon be lost, and what is worse, the disappointment that ensues may result in a repetition 
of strife in the future. The sustainability of institutional outcomes is by no means pre-
ordained, as we discuss in the next section. But a reading of Nepal's political settlement 
does provide evidence that a broader range of socio-political forces are now at play, and if 
their organizational power and demands for rents can be consolidated with progressive rent 
allocating institutions, the changes may indeed be sustainable. However it must be stressed 
that at the time of writing the first phase (provincial) of the two-phase elections have been 
concluded with the next one due in early December. While some pre-election alliances have 
been made, new alliances could emerge later and old ones could unravel. Our evaluation of 
the likelihood of the scenarios is based on alliances that are so far known. 
Some of the political parties and leaders that led the mobilizations and the insurgency, 
including much of the Maoist leadership, have now become ‘mainstream’. But the nature of 
their ‘reversion’ needs to be understood. There was never a realistic possibility of 
institutionalizing a Maoist revolution in Nepal along the 1950s Chinese model. But the 
Maoists have mobilized new groups in society, and many of their leaders realize that totally 
disregarding these social forces will be counter-productive to their own ambitions. This 
configuration of organizational and political forces and the opening up that has happened 
makes us somewhat optimistic that the post-conflict peace is not a return to business as 
usual, and indeed a good time to push for a broad-based and productive economic agenda. 
The direction in which devolution may proceed in Nepal will have important effects on the 
future direction and consolidation of the Nepali political settlement. There were some 
moves towards devolution in the Local Self Government Act in 1999 which expanded the 
mandate of local bodies and devolved substantial powers and budgets to local 
governments. However this mandate was difficult to institutionalize because institutions 
and political power were not aligned (Prasai 2012). The transition was impeded by the fact 
that the tenure of the locally elected representative expired in 2002, after which the central 
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government that was still very authoritarian simply authorised civil servants who were 
posted in the local area to run the functions of these local bodies. Their lack of effective 
power and legitimacy in the regions meant that bureaucrats had to informally work with 
local political elites. But this informal relationship between bureaucrats and politicians 
without strong organizations allowed damaging rent capture by the individuals involved and 
was not very developmental.  
In 2009 a mechanism called the All Party Mechanism was formally implemented where local 
political elites, not just from the political parties, would formulate local policy by consensus. 
Unfortunately, while this structure intended to provide greater representation of diverse 
interests, it morphed into new forms of collusive rent capture by local elites. These APMs 
were disbanded after an investigation by the government but “their presence and influence 
in one form or another continues unabated” (Prasai 2012).  
As the debate over the forms of devolution is by no means over, the evolving institutional 
structures will have important effects on the level and sustainability of the distribution of 
rents at local levels. At one extreme, the institutional structure for distributing rents could 
be decentralized but the distribution of power within party structures could remain 
centralized. If this happened, the ultimate rent allocation decisions would continue to be 
made in a centralized way but would be delivered through formally devolved institutions. 
This arrangement would not satisfy new mobilizations that see devolution as an opportunity 
to exercise their voice and organizational capabilities. This outcome would very likely be 
politically unsustainable in the longer term.  
At the other extreme, there are various possibilities of effective devolution where the 
devolution of formal institutions is associated with the greater political power of provincial 
or local political organizers within political parties. In this case more of the rent allocation 
decisions will effectively be made in response to local power balances but sustainability will 
depend on whether the institutions and rents deliver development. When the first 
constituent assembly failed to come up with a constitution, a second constituent assembly 
was set up in 2013, and the 2015 constitution recognized the growth in the power of 
intermediate classes and the socio-cultural differences across Nepal. The assembly 
proposed a devolution of powers in implicit recognition of the changes in the distribution of 
power that had come about. Beyond that, much of the detail will depend on ongoing 
negotiation and experimentation.  
We believe there are two broad scenarios of effective devolution, one primarily to local 
governments and the other primarily to provinces, with different implications for the 
sustainability of developmental outcomes. They define two different potential trajectories 
for the Nepali political settlement. In reality there may well be some mix of the two, but it is 
useful to discuss them separately at this stage. The two trajectories reflect differences in the 
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evolution of the distribution of power, and are tracked separately in Figure 4. One effect of 
any pattern of devolution may be that the systems for implementing developmental policies 
may become more difficult to coordinate and manage. For instance, if local politicians and 
bureaucrats become more powerful, they may also have a voice in the implementation of 
health, education, infrastructure and other projects. This could mean better accountability 
and control over projects, but could also mean that additional margins are deducted at local 
levels from the resources available for policy implementation. Moreover, resource 
allocation conflicts at the local level may also slow down implementation. However, there 
are reasons for believing that some forms of devolution can have positive dynamic effects 
on inclusive growth.  
In Scenario 1, where the devolution primarily benefits local governments, it may 
paradoxically be easier to achieve greater central monitoring and coordination of these 
rents given that any individual local government is unlikely to have huge holding power. At 
the same time, as a result of greater inclusion of a variety of interests at the local level, the 
collective of the excluded will be more diverse and less disruptive. Hence we hypothesize a 
move of the political settlement towards the upper-left in Figure 4. If institutions can be 
designed to consolidate this distribution of power by allocating rents that are more inclusive 
at this level (therefore satisfying political demands) while generating a growth in productive 
capabilities (achieving economic stability), the institutions of devolution may support 
inclusive growth and be sustainable.  
In Scenario 2, provincial governments become more powerful and outcomes will depend on 
the relationship between parties in power in the provinces and those at the centre. Identity-
based parties are likely to get stronger. In the conditions of Nepal, with the mobilizations in 
two provinces being identity-based, the central coordination of lower-level rent allocation is 
likely to be more difficult. In such a context, other groups that perceive they have been 
excluded are likely to follow suit and demand ethnicity-based devolution. Hence we 
plausibly hypothesize a move in the lower-right direction in Figure 4, with greater 
contestation of ruling coalitions by excluded groups as well as reduced coordination and 
control over lower-level rent allocations in the hands of new clientelist networks at the 
provincial level. These outcomes for local versus provincial devolution are plausible given 
our assessment of the current organization of Nepali politics and the links between identity-
based parties and demands for provincial rights. We are not saying that provincial autonomy 
always has this effect. A scenario where the NC and the Maoists come together looks almost 
impossible now but that could have had more positive outcomes for provincial governments 
and the growth of province-based entrepreneurship. 
As the relevant institutions have not yet been established, the winners of the next election 
or the next few elections will be critical in determining the direction of travel in Nepal. The 
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first scenario is fortunately the most likely direction of travel because it aligned with the 
interests of the UML-Maoist coalition, which currently has a higher chance of winning the 
elections. If they win, they may push for a devolution primarily to local governments. The 
Maoists have not done as well as they had expected in the last round of elections but they 
are still strong in the western Terai, and the UML are strong in the hills. In the first 
constituent assembly the Left wing parties had close to a two-thirds majority. There is 
therefore a good likelihood of the combine winning. In this scenario, given that the UML was 
initially not in favour of strong provincial governments, devolution is likely to primarily 
benefit local governments, many of whom could be run by the Communist parties in this 
scenario. Relations with the Madhes, however, might be more problematic if the Madhesi 
parties win in Province 2. Depending on their margins of victory, the Madhesi parties might 
feel confident enough to take on Kathmandu and demand more powerful provincial 
governments. While the Maoists have supported Madhesi demands in the past they might 
not be willing to oppose the UML right away. The same would be true of identity-based 
provincial demands by the Tharus for province 5, though their mobilizations have not been 
as successful as Madhesi ones.  
Nevertheless, recasting over 3000 village development councils into 744 local governments 
is likely to be difficult, but with the UML’s support for local government this might be a 
better-managed process. On the other hand, even if they win, the two left parties may fall 
out over specific issues leaving the new parliament fractured. History has shown that the 
Left parties have often not been able to make good their alliances, so this optimistic 
scenario is by no means assured. One of the three Left parties that joined the coalition has 
already broken away at the time of writing. 
A less likely but also less favourable outcome for Nepal would be devolution primarily to the 
provinces. This would be a likely scenario if the NC wins with the support of the RPP and 
Madhesi parties. This scenario too faces political challenges. The NC will have to perform a 
balancing act as its coalition partners would lean towards India, especially the RPP, while 
anti-India sentiment is still relatively widespread. It will also have to deal with a more 
demanding China while meeting Indian demands. This tensions could make Nepali politics 
more unstable because the NC will not be able to refuse Chinese overtures. The UML and 
Maoists will also offer a strong opposition and the NC’s coalition allies would be in a 
stronger bargaining position making politics more intensely competitive.  
This scenario gets even more pessimistic if under pressure from the RPP, the NC openly 
embraces right wing and exclusionary Hindu politics. The government would then also have 
to deal with dissatisfaction and possible unrest among those who oppose a formal Hindu tilt 
in governance. The RPP has been successful in driving its Hindutva agenda in some Terai 
districts and this success could make it more ambitious. The NC also has a fairly strong 
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Hindutva lobby with the backing of some leaders. The sustainability of this direction of 
travel may depend on the Indian general elections in 2019. The export of Hindu political 
ideology from across the border will depend on whether and how strongly the BJP comes 
back to power. Of course, India will still try to be heavily involved in Nepal but a non-BJP 
government is unlikely to use the divisive Hindutva card. 
In both scenarios, the chances of violence breaking out again are fortunately relatively slim. 
However, pockets of regional unrest are possible, for instance there may be tensions if the 
Communists win in Kathmandu and the Madhesi parties win soundly in Province 2. The 
Communists are wary of strong provincial governments because they fear that this can 
strengthen identity-based politics. The contestation over the demarcation of provincial 
boundaries that divide Tharu and Madhesi populations is already a strong signal that the 
majority of the political establishment is wary of identity-based provinces. The success of 
this evolving federal structure will depend on how well the Nepali political establishment 
navigates the division of powers between Kathmandu, the provinces, and local 
governments.  
A third, less likely, scenario where the NC and the Maoists come together could imply more 
positive outcomes for provincial governments and the growth of province-based 
entrepreneurship. In case of a post-election realignment resulting in an alliance between 
the Maoists and the NC, a possible outcome could be stronger provincial governments. The 
NC have been somewhat suspicious of NGOs at the local level perceiving them more as a 
support base the UML draws on. The Maoists do too, but in case of an alliance the NC might 
prevail over the Maoists to give more powers to provincial governments. Since the NC sees 
NGOs playing a key role in local politics it could keep in place the policy currently being 
planned to regulate NGOs by making it mandatory for them to seek the permission of local 
bodies for their activities. The NC is strong in urban areas and this could nudge them to 
develop larger provincial cities as commercial hubs and invest in urban management. This 
could however, also lead to more mobilizations based on identity than in the case of an 
UML-Maoist alliance. The instrumentalisation of Hindutva could also follow, depending on 
how well the RPP fares in the next two rounds of elections. In terms of foreign policy the 
alliance is likely to lean towards India. The recent rescinding of the agreement signed with 
the Chinese to develop the Budhi Gandaki hydropower project by the current NC 
government would seem to point in that direction (though it was Dahal’s government which 
had given the project permission). 
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8. Rent Management Challenges for Inclusive Growth  
We now bring together our analysis from previous sections to revisit a number of important 
rent management challenges in Nepal. Some of these challenges are imposing significant 
costs on the Nepali economy and the prospects for inclusive growth, but they are not 
immediately amenable to policy reform given the characteristics of the political settlement. 
Others are both important in terms of impact as well as being feasible to address with 
smarter policy design, particularly by taking advantage of the opportunities opened up by 
changes in the Nepali political settlement. Our underlying theory of change is that we 
should begin by focusing on potentially high-impact reforms that are feasible because their 
success in opening up the development of inclusive growth opportunities will actually make 
other rent challenges easier to address later.  
This section sets up the policy implications of our analysis. We look at some of the 
important types of rents that we identified earlier and their implications for inclusive 
growth. These include the rents associated with the remittance economy, the rents 
associated with trading that are captured by financial, trading, and transportation 
syndicates, the demands for political rents and the challenges and opportunities this can 
create, collusive rent capture by powerful politicians and linked bureaucrats and businesses, 
the rent transfers driven by the intensifying regional competition between India and China, 
and finally the critically important area of developmental rents, particularly those that aim 
to support the diversification and extension of productive capabilities. We conclude that the 
last area of rent management offers the most attractive combination of feasibility and 
impact, particularly if the evolution of political rents proceeds in the direction of greater 
devolution to local governments. Other less important sources of rents are not discussed at 
length. For instance, historically, rents from the exploitation of natural resources like timber 
were important in Nepal but have declined in significance. Taxing and transferring incomes 
potentially creates rents but the tax take from internal sources is still low in Nepal. Other 
sources of rents can be very important at a localized level. For instance, syndicates and 
cartels, especially transport syndicates, have extracted rents by organizing different types of 
monopoly, often with direct or indirect political support.  
The opportunities and challenges around each type of rent depends on how these rents are 
being ‘managed’ given institutions and policies, and the characteristics of the relevant 
organizations affected by these rents, which are described by the political settlement. Rents 
are created through particular institutions and policies, and these, together with the 
contestation of organizations over these rules determine how rents are actually allocated, 
who gets access to them, how they are used, and the conditions under which they may be 
lost. These features describe the rent management system and determine the economic and 
political outcomes that emerge as a result: whether the organizations receiving the rents 
deliver the goods, services or capability improvements, or the political stability that may 
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have justified the rents, or whether the rents are absorbed without any results, or indeed 
with damaging outcomes, which we describe as unproductive rent capture. Some rents, of 
course, are not intended to achieve any productive or political stability results, and are more 
in the nature of extraction from society by powerful groups. In all cases there is an explicit 
or implicit set of rent management institutions and organizations that can explain particular 
outcomes. Feasible reform strategies need to ask what would need to change in this set of 
rent management institutions and organizations to achieve better development outcomes, 
and whether these changes are feasible given the political settlement.  
 
Rents linked to the remittance economy  
While remittances have contributed to poverty reduction, they have also distorted 
aspects of the economy and made industrialization and domestic job creation more 
difficult. Remittance inflows are not directly rents. But the institutional management of 
these flows and the conversion of foreign exchange remittances into Nepali Rupees has 
created massive rents for politicians, the banking system and organizations involved in 
imports. The simplest way to understand this is as follows: Nepali workers overseas earn 
incomes in say dollars and send it back to Nepal. The dollars go to the central bank, the 
Nepal Rashtra Bank, which keeps the dollars, while relatives of foreign workers are given 
Nepali rupees. But the Nepali rupee is somewhat overvalued, because it is pegged to the 
stronger Indian rupee at a fixed rate. As a result, importers and businesses who then get 
access to the dollars from the central bank at the official exchange rate can use it to import 
products that they can sell at a significant margin in the domestic market. An overvalued 
official exchange rate implicitly transfers income from those who earn foreign exchange (in 
this case Nepali expatriate workers) to those who spend or mediate the spending of the 
foreign exchange (including the financial system, importers, wholesalers, retailers and so 
on). This is a significant source of rents for all these organizations, even if some of the 
mediation is quite complex. Arguably, the final consumers of imported products also benefit 
somewhat from the overvalued currency, but the lion’s share of the benefit is captured as 
rents by different intermediaries because of syndicates and market power, discussed in the 
next section. 
The scale of the easy rents from remittances mean that the damaging policies and 
institutions that sustain and manage these rents are difficult to reform. These include in 
particular the overvalued exchange rate and the damaging effects this has on export-
oriented industries. It may not be stretching the analysis too far to say that it is not only the 
middlemen in the labour export business who have an interest in sustaining high rates of 
Nepali labour migration.  A broad range of other powerful interests are implicitly interested 
in the same thing because of the lucrative nature of the rent intermediation. Moreover, 
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exporting large numbers of workers reduces political pressure for the difficult tasks of 
creating domestic employment. The danger, of course, is that a shock in labour importing 
countries can result in large numbers of Nepali workers suddenly returning, which would be 
truly destabilizing for the country.  
Our assessment is that the rents associated with the remittance economy are very 
significant in Nepal, given the scale of remittances and even a moderate overvaluation of 
the Nepali Rupee. The use or misuse of these rents by the organizations that eventually 
capture them, like traders, political networks, banks, and other intermediaries is actually not 
the main problem. An even more important problem is that these rents are underpinned by 
institutional and policy arrangements that damage the economy through the persistent 
overvaluation of the currency and the subordination of policies supporting domestic 
employment generation. Addressing these underlying problems is likely to face resistance 
from the beneficiaries of these huge rents. These beneficiaries are very diverse and are 
likely to be linked to many different political parties in different ways. Reforming the system 
may therefore be quite difficult given the competitive clientelist political settlement.  
This is a difficult problem because a number of things need to happen in parallel for reform 
to be beneficial. Nepal needs to achieve a combination of lower import dependence, greater 
domestic production and employment, lower outmigration of labour, all underpinned by a 
gradually depreciating currency. Trying to achieve the latter without the other components 
will not work as it will be inflationary and reduce living standards. But the achievement of 
more domestic production and industrialization also requires moving towards a more 
competitive currency. If this transition can be achieved, the coalitions capturing rents from 
remittances and trade (next section) will economically lose out to new coalitions engaged in 
domestic production. This can be sustained if the latter have growing power and influence 
as a result of the wealth they generate. They may be able to take on the former, providing 
the transition happens gradually. Therefore, while it would be wrong to see the policy 
challenge as one of immediate devaluation, a gradual devaluation of the currency may be 
an important part of a policy package that includes effective strategies of industrialization 
and domestic job creation. This would require, but only as part of the package, a strategy for 
loosening the link between the Nepali and Indian currencies, perhaps by moving from a 
fixed peg to a band-based peg.  
 
Trade-related rents  
As a land-locked country with a unique combination of almost open borders with India 
that are difficult to police, as well as formal tariffs on many good, Nepal faces particularly 
difficult problems in collecting customs duties and preventing a major leakage of these 
potential taxes into informal rents. These conditions create significant opportunities for 
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trade related taxes to be captured by a variety of informal political, bureaucratic, trading 
and transportation networks as informal rents. These rents are captured through the 
collusion of transportation and trade syndicates, public officers involved in border control 
and customs, and formal and informal political networks. The sharing of a part of these 
informal rents with political networks contributes to making enforcement difficult. The 
informal rent capture in trade is not just a loss of formal revenues for government. It creates 
a problem for domestic industries that are ostensibly supposed to be protected by these 
tariffs. Smugglers can undercut the tariff protection sufficiently to make emerging domestic 
industry suffer while also raising their transaction costs in trade because of corrupt practices 
at border posts and the syndication of trade and transportation networks. The joint effect is 
adverse for domestic producers and consumers.  
As we saw earlier, trade with India provided significant rents to Nepal when India was a 
controlled, protected economy. At that time Nepal had relatively few restrictions on imports 
and Indian traders could buy goods in Nepal unavailable in India and sell them across the 
border with high margins by evading Indian customs duties. Nepal is no longer the entrepôt 
economy that it was before the liberalization of the Indian economy when it benefited from 
the ‘customs arbitrage’. Indian liberalization and the relative strength of the Indian economy 
have now become a constraint on Nepal’s economic growth as it creates perverse incentives 
to invest in syndicates to maintain oligopolistic trading ventures to control the flow of 
imports and extract value from Nepali consumers. The overvaluation of the Nepali currency 
allows trade to be used to extract rents, with trading syndicates importing products that are 
cheap at the border in terms of Nepali rupees but that can be sold on at higher mark-ups in 
Nepal to capture rents. The rents that can be captured are even higher if customs duties on 
the Nepali side are evaded. The combination of oligopolistic trading and transportation 
syndicates using market power, an overvalued exchange rate and customs evasion adds up 
to the potential of capturing very substantial rents through trade, at considerable cost to 
consumers, the government budget and domestic industry.  
Some estimates from a decade ago suggest that illegal and informal trade with India could 
be close to 40 percent of the total trade between the two countries (The Himalayan) and 
not much has changed since then. A recent report by the South Asia Watch on Trade 
Economics and Environment (SAWTEE) provides some data illustrating the scale of this 
issue. The study shows, for instance, that twenty percent of seeds that Nepali farmers use 
arrive through illegal channels or smuggling. Fertiliser is another item smuggled regularly. 
Diammonium Phosphate (DAP) costs NR 46-48 at border markets, especially Birganj on the 
Nepali border, the location of choice for both illegal and formal trading. The same product 
sells for between NPR 36-38 in Indian markets (Post Report 2017). The difference in price 
shows that traders were not just capturing the overvaluation rent, and possibly the unpaid 
customs duties, but also adding a margin based on market power created by syndication. 
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The difference in the price of some seeds between the formally imported and smuggled 
markets was NPR 3, high enough for poor farmers to purchase from the informal trade. This 
difference reflects the fact that smuggled goods have not paid customs duties and some of 
this ‘benefit’ is passed on in lower prices and the rest captured by the smugglers, but prices 
in both the formal and smuggled markets are high because of other factors, including 
oligopolistic trading syndicates and artificial scarcities created by supply bottlenecks, which 
we discuss next.  
It is interesting to note that there has been a recent concerted push for greater 
transparency of customs data and automated verification at customs points to reduce 
customs leakages. However, even if customs evasion can be reduced, this will not reduce 
prices in Nepal (and may even increase them), but may reduce the leakage of customs 
duties into informal rents. Apart from the market power of trading syndicates, there are 
other problems that contribute to create supply bottlenecks in Nepal. The most important is 
the fact that imports into Nepal are almost entirely dependent on Indian ports, and 
transportation by Indian trucks and railways to the Nepal border. Imports of DAP, for 
instance, are entirely reliant on ports in India, usually Kolkata and Haldia, which are 
notoriously inefficient. Consignments meant for Nepal are held up due to both inefficiencies 
at ports, but also local political rivalries between parties competing to ‘control’ ports. 
Addressing these problems is beyond the capacity of the Nepali state but exposes it to the 
vagaries of India’s trading syndicates and its domestic politics. At the time of researching 
this paper a large consignment of fertilisers bound for Nepal was stuck in Haldia port at the 
height of the sowing season. It would not be wrong to assume that illegal channels for 
fertiliser imports would be the only option for farmers and that they would have to pay a 
huge premium. 
A different and particularly distasteful type of rent associated with cross-border trade 
involves human trafficking. The illegal nature of this trade provides large rents for the 
organizers of these types of ‘transactions’. Anecdotal evidence suggests that criminal 
activity in the form of trafficking of underage girls and young women to India and further 
afield, and the organization of surrogate motherhood, provide large sources of rents for 
mafia and politicians on both sides of the India-Nepal border. Hard evidence will always be 
difficult to collate but work done by anti-trafficking NGOs in Nepal like Maiti and others 
have uncovered evidence of a significant scale of activity. The nature of trafficking has also 
changed and no longer includes only sex workers but also illegal migrant labour.  
Money laundering by criminal ‘dons’ or ‘gundas’ on both sides use fake product trading as a 
way of laundering money from other illicit sources. Margins are paid as rents to 
bureaucratic and political networks facilitating these activities. An emerging area of concern 
relates to money laundering on a bigger scale by external players through Nepal. We only 
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have anecdotal evidence so far, but this involves large foreign ‘investments’ that allegedly 
provide the cover to legalize and launder external funds that are then shortly afterwards 
transferred out of Nepal. Again, local intermediaries can skim significant rents by facilitating 
these processes. These flows are large and obviously unaccounted for but given that these 
activities involve political corruption on both sides of the border, efforts to curb them are 
likely to be unsuccessful and this has been the experience in the past. While controlling 
these damaging rents is likely to be difficult, in some areas public scrutiny and pressure, 
particularly in the case of trafficking and money laundering, can have an impact.  
The Indian border is thus a source of complex rents associated with a number of overlapping 
policy and institutional arrangements. The latter create conditions that allow well-organized 
networks to capture informal and sometimes criminal rents. Again, our concern is not so 
much with how these rents are subsequently used, but rather with the distortionary effects 
of the institutions and policies creating these rents. These policies and institutions create 
direct social damage in the form of overpriced consumer goods, undermining of targeted 
protection for growing industries, the exploitation of women and other vulnerable groups 
through trafficking and so on. Of course, who captures the rents also matters because the 
rents reproduce the power of networks and organizations that are responsible for sustaining 
these policies and institutions. Some of these rents will therefore be difficult to address in 
the short run. However, some of the more egregious processes such as trafficking and some 
cross-border trades based on syndicates should be continuously targeted by public 
mobilization and pressure. The pressure is likely to be even more effective if domestic 
productive interests in emerging industries can be mobilized against smuggling that affects 
their businesses.  
 
Political rents and the effects of devolution  
The allocation of ‘political’ rents to powerful political organizations and networks is 
critical for maintaining political stability. Devolution will change the allocation of these 
rents. In developing countries, a large part of the rents for political stabilization are 
allocated through informal arrangements (Khan 2005). Getting these mechanisms wrong 
may result in excessively large rents being captured by political players, and could also fail to 
achieve political instability. Political arrangements and rent distribution mechanisms in 
Nepal have repeatedly been found wanting and have resulted in successive ‘andolans’ that 
have changed the distribution of power across political organizations over time. As these 
changes are still ongoing, the rent management challenges in this area will depend on how 
institutions evolve over time. In general, demands for political rents in Nepal are likely to 
increasingly come from lower levels of society and are also likely to become more intense 
over time. This is in line with patterns in other countries in South Asia. The hope is that 
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there will be changes in political institutions through forms of devolution that will be able to 
match these demands with mechanisms for delivering political rents to new constituencies. 
The longer-term risks and opportunities depend on the pattern of devolution, and in our 
section on scenarios, we discussed a number of possibilities, summarized in Figure 4. 
There are reasons, however, to be optimistic because devolution of some types may allow 
better management of some types of developmental rent allocations. Devolved political 
structures may allow the allocation of rents to smaller entrepreneurs who are not politically 
connected to central political networks and who may therefore be easier to discipline at the 
local level (see Box 2). If devolution evolves primarily in the direction of local governments, 
there may be significant opportunities for achieving both a more inclusive allocation of rents 
with better developmental rent management. Political inclusion would also increase if a 
broad range of potential entrepreneurs at the local level had access to policy rents in the 
form of, say, enterprise start-up credits and other forms of support that would allow them 
to sustainably improve their incomes and create new jobs. If this inclusion strategy was 
combined with a system for managing these resources to create compulsions for 
productivity growth and achieving competitiveness (discussed in the last subsection), these 
rent allocations could achieve both political stability and inclusive growth.  
 
Collusive rent capture  
Low capability business organizations, networked with politicians with short time horizons 
engage in collusive behaviour and the extraction of damaging rents. Politicians with short 
time horizons are more likely to create rents that are quick to capture using strategies like 
market restrictions, padded contracts and so on for businesses connected to them. These 
types of rents enrich the beneficiaries and impoverish others. Low capability businesses 
have no other feasible way of making significant returns and are likely to spend much of 
their time scouting for these opportunities. In contrast, policies that aim to achieve 
structural transformations in the country, for instance by creating a broad productive base 
of entrepreneurs, also require the allocation of rents, but they have to be managed properly 
over time. A much broader group of beneficiaries are eventually better off, including the 
politicians and businesses, as the examples of South Korea in the 1960s and China in the 
1980s show. Unfortunately, politicians who have limited enforcement capabilities and short 
time horizons are unlikely to pursue these types of policies very seriously, first because the 
benefits accrue over time, but secondly because they require intensive management and 
disciplining of beneficiaries. These politicians may nevertheless have enough clout and 
personalized links with well-placed bureaucrats, intermediaries and businesses to engage in 
collusive and damaging rent-creation.  
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The recent spike in investments in hydel power projects is (a relatively benign) example of 
how damaging rents can be created and captured by exploiting speculative investment 
opportunities. In this case the investment opportunities were real enough, but the 
organization of the process created rent capture opportunities that may have resulted in 
excessive investments in projects that were not economically efficient. Licences and 
contracts were granted for everything from conducting feasibility studies to allowing 
investments in hydro-power projects. But the licenses and contracts were transferred 
through intermediaries before being allocated to speculative final bidders at a higher price. 
Intermediaries with connections were able to collectively capture huge rents for projects 
covering around 30,000 MW of potential power generation, many of which will never 
materialize. A popular phrase capturing what was going on was ‘jhola mein khola’, or a little 
river project in every bag. The projects themselves were not always technically very efficient 
and sought to generate electricity at a relatively high unit cost. These may not have been 
the most desirable way of generating more power in Nepal given that the country is 
attempting to catch up on its manufacturing competitiveness with neighbouring countries. 
Interestingly, licencing procedures have since been strengthened as a result of public 
pressure, some of it around the management of the hydel projects.  
Of late improvements in the supply of electricity have been the cause for some optimism in 
Nepal.  One reason for the improvement is, however, that India has significantly increased 
its electricity exports to Nepal. In the last three years India’s exports to Nepal have 
increased 2.5 times and is set to increase more by using two transmission lines in Katiya and 
Raxual in Bihar, whose construction has recently been completed. This was of course 
complemented by the work done by the director of the NEA Kul Man Ghising who was able 
to regulate electricity supply and reduce some of the illegal diversion of electricity. Two 
factors stand out here. Domestic Nepali electricity generation is still low, and this is of 
concern since Nepal has the potential to export electricity to regional countries rather than 
import it from India. Secondly, much of the good work done by Mr Ghising is not 
institutionalised and risks being reversed once his tenure is over. We will therefore only 
know after a few years if the combination of factors that have resulted in improvements in 
power supply are sustainable.  
It may not be feasible to simultaneously address all collusive practices between politicians, 
intermediaries and investors in developing countries. This is why it is important to have a 
rents analysis that can identify the more damaging instances of collusive behaviour, where 
the policies creating the rents or the process of capturing the rents are particularly 
damaging. We also need an analysis of the likely drivers of corruption, to identify whether 
these can be feasibly addressed in that case, so that we can identify national anti-corruption 
priorities in terms of feasibility (Khan, et al. 2016). In the case of the collusive behaviour in 
the hydel power case, the process of rent capture may have resulted in significant resource 
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misallocation and directed resources into inefficient investments. An analysis of the 
processes behind the contracting also suggests that it may have been feasible to address 
some of these problems if there was public pressure for improvements in transparency in 
the awarding of contracts. Indeed, licencing procedures for hydel projects have been slowly 
improving.  
However, damaging collusion is not always due to a lack of transparency. In more difficult 
cases, collusion happens because the colluding parties are powerful and those who lose out 
are unable to prevent it even when they know what is going on. This is often the case in 
developing countries. For instance, collusion between politicians and investors in the 
granting of mega projects in infrastructure development are very difficult to address 
through calls for greater transparency or improved procurement rules alone. These types of 
corruption and collusion are only likely to be significantly reduced when power in societies 
becomes more broad-based, and there are a large number of firms that could feasibly 
supply these services and which stand to lose as a result of collusive behaviour. This in turn 
requires the creation of a broad range of productive capabilities through inclusive growth, 
which is why we argue that the most important task for policy is to promote the spread of 
broad-based productive capabilities. 
 
India-China competition and opaque ‘influencing’ rents 
The intensifying competition for influence between India and China is likely to inject rents 
that may affect the balance of power between domestic parties. The emergence of China 
and India, and particularly the former, as partners with the capacity to inject different forms 
of rents into developing countries has raised new challenges across the developing world. In 
Nepal in particular, a variety of opaque resource transfers are likely, for instance using the 
project financing arrangements, or directly providing secretive rents for competing political 
coalitions and politicians that can tilt the funds available to different parties.  
These inflows could take a number of forms and there are indications that some of these 
are already happening, allowing collusive rent capture by particular politicians or political 
parties. The most likely ways in which these flows may come in include big ‘investments’ in 
areas like hydropower and other infrastructure projects where intermediaries connected to 
particular political parties are deliberately allowed to make significant margins as 
intermediaries or business partners, with some of the rents captured then being passed on 
to political organizations. By its nature, these types of transactions are difficult to track in 
practice. Our intention in pointing this out is simply to identify a plausible possibility. Apart 
from the effects that such inflows may have on tilting the relative power of domestic parties 
and organizations, and thereby influencing or disrupting the political settlement, there is 
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also the possibility that the selection of the investments may not be determined on 
calculations of long-term efficiency or social benefit.  
While rent inflows from India and China play a special role in Nepal, in the context of 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) China and India are still smaller players. Aid from 
western countries is relatively tightly controlled by the donors. They do occasionally have 
distorting effects on the domestic economy but development partners have become 
gradually better at mitigating these risks. The World Bank was the top multilateral donor 
and the UK was the leading bilateral donor in 2012-13, though the Bank’s disbursements 
had declined from the previous year (IECCD 2014). Nepal also received a large influx of aid 
after the earthquake in 2015. Even in 2011 long before the earthquake, aid accounted for 22 
per cent of the government budget (Banyan 2011). ODA can be a double-edged sword in 
Nepal, as in other LMICs that receive large sums of aid. Some donor interventions in health, 
education and communitisation of forestry in Nepal have been held up as success stories.  
However aid ‘rents’, ‘NGO-isation’ and interference in local affairs have also been a criticism 
of ODA-driven policies in the country. For instance in the 1990s donors in Nepal started 
pumping large sums of money into networks around community user groups. The leaders of 
these user groups and the NGOs in the local area soon became recipients of large sums 
which were captured by them. In 2011 the Economist reported that 60 to 90 per cent of aid 
in the Terai was ‘misused’ and captured by politically connected networks. The article goes 
on to state that any effort at curbing this by officials actually leads to protests by locals who 
depend on these incomes they accrue through their political affiliations (Banyan 2011). The 
latest increase in the inflow of aid has been due to reconstruction activities after the 
earthquake. These efforts have also come in for some criticism for their opacity and non-
implementation. One reason for aid rents having a distorting effect in poor countries is that 
even small margins of capture provide political parties and powerful networks with 
resources they need to maintain their local patron-client structures. The implementation 
gets distorted (as we would expect from the political settlements framework) the more 
divergent the aid spending is from the interests of powerful local interests. It is important to 
remember that powerful local organizations could include organizations of poor people. Any 
attempt at ensuring transparency in the use of aid therefore has to be carefully designed, 
for instance by spending aid in ways that at least some sufficiently powerful local interests 
support as being aligned with their own interest.   
 
Developmental rents and organizational capabilities  
Developmental policies, whether delivering skills, health, education or addressing market 
failures create rents for different organizations and they have to be carefully designed if 
good results are to be achieved. Here we look at a specific type of intervention that we 
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argue is of great importance for accelerating the emergence of a broad-based inclusive 
economy. One of the most binding of all constraints limiting inclusive growth is that 
developing countries do not have a large number of organizations (firms, farms and so on) 
with the capabilities to organize production using modern technologies and large 
workforces. Countries that fail to crack the problem of creating broad-based organizational 
capabilities in its business sector cannot sustain inclusive growth.  
When firms lack organizational capabilities they fail to achieve competitiveness even when 
they have access to finance to buy the appropriate machines and have access to skilled 
workers. The organization of competitive production systems requires a lot of ‘tacit 
knowledge’ (knowledge that has to be learned in practice) about how to organize factories, 
manage inventories, control quality, manage the value chain and so on. Organizations are 
not born with this tacit knowledge, they have to acquire it through difficult processes of 
learning-by-doing under continuous pressure to achieve competitiveness. Learning-by-doing 
has to be financed because a firm that is not yet competitive will effectively be making a loss 
by engaging in production. The extra finance required to operate at this time is not likely to 
be provided by banks or external investors because this investment does not create 
collateral that can back the investment (unlike buying a machine or a piece of land). 
Investments in learning are therefore subject to serious market failures.  
The importance of supportive policies to accelerate the emergence of new firms in these 
contexts has been historically recognized by policy-makers. Strategies of supporting 
emerging enterprises have included protection using tariffs on imports, duty drawbacks, 
cash subsidies, and so on. Unfortunately this is an area where rent management often fails, 
and too many firms take advantage of protection to continue producing in inefficient ways 
failing to raise their productivity by putting in the requisite effort in learning. Emerging firms 
do need to have access to policy support, but the rents have to be conditional, and have to 
be either withdrawn rapidly if there is poor performance or only granted ex post to reward 
investments once performance has been established (Khan 2013b, 2013c).  
Not surprisingly, traditional methods of support (tariffs, subsidies and so on) appear to have 
performed very poorly in Nepal. Each of these forms of support require the enforcement of 
specific monitoring and withdrawal rules to create effective compulsions to raise 
productivity and competitiveness. These rules are generally difficult or impossible to enforce 
in configurations of power where businesses are powerful but have low capabilities, and 
enforcement agencies are weak. These are exactly the configurations of power in the 
political settlement that we identified in Box 2 and Figure 4 in Nepal and so the poor results 
of these conventional strategies are not surprising.  
Larger firms and conglomerates in Nepal are linked into political networks that make them 
hard to discipline. Moreover, policy support is delivered by bureaucrats who are also hard to 
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discipline and many of the incentives require the payment of bribes and much wasting of 
time, which significantly reduces their usefulness. As the enforcement capacity of the ruling 
coalition is weak and not likely to be significantly improved in the near future, it may be 
necessary to look for potentially promising SMEs in likely growth sectors as targets of 
industrial policy. The advantage of SMEs is that they generally use more labour-intensive 
technologies (and therefore are better for inclusive growth anyway) and are less likely to 
have the holding power to block rent withdrawal if they are underperforming. This is not 
always the case, and some SME firms in some sectors may be difficult to discipline. But as a 
general proposition, a shift towards SME sectors in areas like food and beverage production, 
garments and textiles, components production for the construction industry, service sector 
supply chains servicing a medium to high-budget tourism sector, and some niche IT sectors, 
may result in better rent management outcomes given the political settlement. The IT 
sector in Nepal lacks the scale required to be globally competitive, though it can still provide 
some meaningful employment if it attempts to serve the domestic market. 
The low likelihood of disciplining the bureaucracy in delivering and enforcing conventional 
support strategies also means that we also need to look for other policy mechanisms. The 
experience of other successful learning strategies in South Asia suggests some possibilities. 
For instance, some remarkable successes have been achieved in Bangladesh and India based 
on partnerships with foreign companies to develop local capabilities, with the partners 
being rewarded ex post. Examples include the Bangladesh garments industry and the Indian 
automobile industry (discussed later) (Khan 2013b, 2013d; Black, et al. 2018). Because of 
the targeted nature of these support policies, significant bureaucratic capabilities were not 
required, though some specific capabilities may need to be developed for relevant 
bureaucratic agencies. These successes suggest that in South Asian political settlements, 
mechanisms of providing incentives to foreign investors to transfer capabilities to raise the 
productivity of domestic firms can work a lot better for capability development than 
financing domestic firms and trying to discipline them to force productivity improvements. 
The selection of promising sectors where enterprise can be promoted also needs to be 
addressed. We believe this should be based on a pragmatic assessment of likely points of 
entry into global value chains, given current competitive capabilities, and domestic market 
opportunities in areas like tourism. We have not conducted a formal study of such 
opportunities for Nepal, but it seems plausible to us that the types of SME sectors referred 
to earlier would figure prominently. We do not believe it is possible to identify potentially 
promising sectors in Nepal using an arithmetic analysis of Revealed Comparative Advantage 
based on the export shares of particular sectors in Nepal relative to the world average 
(Balassa 1964)3. This is because in developing countries, particularly in countries like Nepal 
                                                      
3 This approach was recently used in an unpublished work on Nepal by Whiteshield Partners. 
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which do not yet have significant volumes of exports, small differences in the export 
performances of sectors are more likely to reflect differences in their rent capture abilities 
rather than revealing their underlying global comparative advantage. 
The foreign interest in investing in Nepal offers opportunities of converting at least some of 
the FDI into this type of capability transferring investment. As Figure 5 shows, 
manufacturing seems to have been getting a fair share of overseas investment and a closer 
look at the sectors receiving FDI provides some direction for policy. Two of the more 
popular FDI destinations are cement and food processing. In the latter India is already a big 
player and Bangladesh has made an entry. This sector could have more employment 
potential than cement. Indian joint ventures, especially in food processing seem to do well 
in Nepal despite the sometimes fraught relationship between the two countries. More 
investments to serve the Nepali market would be an attractive option for Indian investors, 
and some of these investments could be structured to be capability transfers to Nepali firms 
for which the Indian or other foreign partner would be heavily rewarded. Indian investors 
are unlikely to use Nepal as a manufacturing base to supply the Indian market with food 
products because of higher wages and transport costs. But it is possible for Nepali 
manufactures to provide agro-industry products to India, Bangladesh and other regional 
markets based on product differentiation, cheaper agricultural inputs and so on.  
Source: Xu and Hager 2017, Figure 4, Pg 19 
Figure 5 Global FDI by Sector in Nepal: 2009-2014 
China is another country that is making inroads in Nepali manufacturing, especially through 
its investments in the cement, energy and tourism sector. Tourism is also a sector with great 
potential in Nepal but little is done to actively promote it. The development of tourism 
requires the development of a coherent national strategy for the sector as high-value and 
backpack tourism cannot be simultaneously organized in the same venues. There is 
considerable potential for Nepal in both segments of the tourism market provided a 
coherent strategy and planning can emerge, and if domestic firms can be assisted to 
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develop high quality services in particular market segments. Here too, capability 
development strategies are required for spread effects in employment generation on a 
broad scale, but also combined with a plan for the sector as a whole so that developments 
in one segment do not hurt the development of another segment.  
 
Vignettes of successful Nepali firm development 
We looked at a number of vignettes of successful firm development in Nepal to get a better 
understanding of the processes through which successful firms emerged in sectors as 
diverse as garments, tea, and steel. These experiences of successful enterprise development 
in Nepal show that when competitive enterprises emerged, they did so without much 
assistance from policy. Moreover, overall there has been disappointing development of 
capabilities in modern industry and manufacturing. An interesting feature in a number of 
firm development vignettes that we developed for this study show that in all these cases 
much of the capability development happened through the participation of foreign firms, 
often Indian, who were paid to transfer capabilities to Nepali counterparts. This is exactly 
what happened in the Bangladeshi garments industry, referred to earlier, with capabilities 
transferred by a South Korean firm, and in the Indian automobile case, where capabilities 
were transferred by a Japanese firm and later the Koreans. However, in these cases, the 
capability transfers were more significant because they were assisted by policy rents while 
in the Nepali case the transfers were internally financed by particular companies with 
limited spillovers to other firms. The challenge for Nepal is to devise policy instruments that 
are based on a knowledge of what works so that broader swathes of firms can benefit from 
learning and capability development.  
As part of our research we investigated a number of successful firms in sectors we identified 
as some of the promising ones where broad based manufacturing capabilities could be 
developed in Nepal.4 Our selected firms were a leading garments exporter, one of the 
country’s largest tea plantations and processing units successfully exporting organic tea to 
western destinations, and a steel company which has grown to be a large firm in the 
construction materials sector. Our respondents spoke freely because we agreed to 
anonymize the results so we will report general findings rather than specific details. The 
three sectors were also chosen for their employment potential, their existing capabilities 
and their export potential. Nepal’s merchandise exports are still very limited (USD 740mn) 
again underlining the importance of prioritizing labour-intensive export capabilities. Tea 
(along with spices and coffee) accounts for 7.9 percent of Nepal’s exports, garments 
(excluding knits) 7.3 percent and iron and steel 3.8 percent. Tracing the evolution of these 
firms from their inception to their current successful status provided us with a micro-level 
                                                      
4 We acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Avinash Gupta for providing the material for these vignettes.  
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view of the constraints they faced and overcame. This ‘descriptive understanding’ is robust 
enough to confirm our findings because they are largely consistent with our theoretical 
expectations based on the experiences of other South Asian countries with similar political 
settlements.  
In all our firms, the support provided to the firms by formal policies played almost no role in 
their subsequent success. Some policy rents were received without making any impact on 
learning but a large part also did not reach the firms at all because of corruption by 
bureaucrats. In all our firms, initial management and organizational capabilities were low 
and the firms struggled for a long time to acquire enough competitiveness in price and 
quality to begin to export. The corruption that distorted the implementation of a variety of 
support policies is the policy-distorting variant of corruption discussed in Khan (Khan 2006, 
2014). In these variants of corruption the appropriate response is to pursue the policy 
objectives with a differently designed intervention to reduce the distortions caused by the 
corruption (as opposed to eliminating the rents, which is the appropriate response in other 
types of corruption). None of our three companies were politically connected to the extent 
that this allowed them to access significant rents. But political connections were frequently 
important for overcoming obstacles and corruption demands coming from the bureaucratic 
system. All our respondents reported they had trouble accessing sectoral incentives because 
of corruption, but they also did not appear to benefit from the incentives that they did 
receive, perhaps because the rents were not associated with any conditions that 
encouraged them to raise their productivity.  
The three sectors that we looked at are all subject to specific problems faced by 
manufacturing sectors in Nepal. They are competing with Bangladeshi, Cambodian and 
Indian workers who generally have lower wages and work in firms that achieve higher 
productivity and product quality. Competitiveness is a function of productivity, wages and 
quality. A country can overcome the disadvantage of slightly higher wages if it can 
compensate for this with higher productivity or higher quality. Both are functions of the 
organizational capabilities of the firms in the sector, which may allow them to use 
technologies more effectively and achieve better quality control, inventory management 
and so on, to achieve a competitive edge. As wages cannot, and should not, be lowered as a 
way of achieving competitiveness, the binding constraint is usually the lack of sufficiently 
sophisticated organizational capabilities based on the tacit knowledge that can be acquired 
through learning-by-doing.  
The firms we studied in all three sectors acquired competitiveness and export success 
through a long and tortuous process of capability development that they mostly financed 
themselves. A common strategy was to hire technically competent staff from India, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh to help in the learning process and to transfer critical missing 
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capabilities to the firms. In the case of the garments exporter the company hired a 
supervisor from India who oversaw the business while they also brought in trainers from 
Bangladesh. The firm began as a job-working subcontractor but now exports independently. 
It is also supplying to one of Nepal’s few internationally successful clothing brands. The 
irony is that while the international company still has some production facilities in Nepal it is 
moving out a large share of its production to more competitive production sites like 
Vietnam.  
The Nepali garments industry achieved rapid growth during the period of the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) when Indian companies set up garments units in Nepal to make use of 
the quota-free access to the USA that Nepal enjoyed. However once the MFA came to an 
end, the Indian units folded up and the sector went into decline. The share of the garments 
sector had reached 40 percent of total manufacturing output in 2000. But by 2003 there 
were only 35 firms left and the sector had virtually disappeared, with the insurgency also 
having a negative effect. The few remaining firms that are now successful in the sector, 
including our respondent, have been able to use some of the learning from those years to 
develop their capability. The Nepali garments sector thus had a very different trajectory 
from the Bangladeshi one, which acquired competitive capabilities during the MFA period, 
and therefore continued unaffected when MFA ended.  
The Bangladeshi garment industry was different because there was capability transfer from 
a South Korean firm to a Bangladeshi one a time when the South Koreans were trying to set 
up new manufacturing units in territories that were not quota constrained under the MFA 
(Khan 2013a). But in contrast to Nepal, the South Koreans did not directly invest in the 
garments industry to any significant extent. The organizations that emerged were largely 
Bangladeshi from the outset and a broad-based learning commenced across the sector. 
When MFA ended, there were thousands of Bangladeshi firms that were now competitive 
enough in terms of their organizational capabilities to survive without MFA, and growth 
continued at a high pace. In Nepal, local firms entered the market too late to develop 
sufficient capabilities to survive the end of MFA, and the Indian firms clearly had no long run 
interest in staying in Nepal as their prime interest was in exploiting the MFA opportunities. 
Without that, they preferred to be located in India.  
The garments sector in Nepal thus has to work very hard to come back into prominence as it 
has been left behind by growth in Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia and India. However, 
there are opportunities in higher-value niche sectors that our vignette firm was focused on. 
As Nepal has somewhat higher wages, it should focus on higher-value garments for the 
tourist and export market. But producing competitively in this segment requires high 
organizational capabilities, including maintaining networks with international design and 
quality control networks, maintaining quality control and efficient inventories and squeezing 
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higher productivity out of better production process management. These capabilities need 
to be learnt, as our successful firm did, but we cannot expect broad-based growth if this 
learning is left to the devices of individual entrepreneurs with the deep pockets and 
perseverance to pursue these competitiveness goals.   
In the case of the tea company, the owner hired a Darjeeling-based engineer to design his 
factory. Major functions like withering and rolling are still run by experts from the Darjeeling 
tea industry and a Sri Lankan tea industry expert helped run the CTC (crush, tear and curl) 
factory initially. Only ten percent of senior executives in the Nepali tea industry are Nepali, 
with Indians and Sri Lankans still helping to run the large processing units. The owner of the 
tea company is politically connected through personal networks and he used these 
connections to overcome instances of policy-distorting corruption demands.  
The tea sector in Nepal was a public sector monopoly till the 1990s and there were no 
policy-based learning rents for the private sector at that time. However the tea sector is 
now a successful export-oriented sector and has high small-holder participation. Export 
growth will therefore have a positive impact on poverty reduction across the sector 
(SAWTEE 2006). This is in contrast to neighboring India which is a very successful tea 
exporter and where large tea plantations are the norm. But in India, poverty is high among 
tea workers in the estates in eastern and north-eastern India. The tea plants in most of 
Darjeeling’s tea estates are also very old and Nepal has a significant advantage here. The tea 
sector in Nepal is therefore potentially important for inclusive growth. Though most of the 
tea acreage is for lower value CTC and not orthodox (whole leaf) teas, Nepal has been 
making progress in organic orthodox teas for which a large premium overseas market exists. 
More can be done with proper policy design that focuses on branding and marketing and 
expanding access to overseas markets. The other opportunity here is that big buyers of 
Darjeeling tea like Germany might want to expand supply sources after the Gorkhaland 
agitation in tea growing areas of Darjeeling hit supplies. 
The steel maker’s experiences, both of policy-distorting corruption and his use of external 
organizational assistance for technological upgradation, mirrors the experience of the firms 
in the other two sectors. The operations of the company’s steel and pipe making units were 
overseen by a consultant from India. While the workers in all our three firms were 
eventually mostly Nepali, the garments exporter and steel maker had initially started out 
with some Indian workers. In the case of the steel company some of the skilled workers are 
still Indian. This company also hired semi-skilled Nepali workers who were already working 
in steel units in India.   
The construction sector that our respondent services accounts for close to eleven percent of 
Nepal’s GDP. Owing to the vast number of Nepali migrants who work in the construction 
sector in the Middle East, the sector also has ready access to skilled labour. A particular type 
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of flat rolled steel products is one of Nepal’s biggest exports. The sector had taken a hit after 
the blockade of 2015 but is seeing some signs of recovery on the back of work related to 
earthquake reconstruction. Given its export potential, India is the biggest importer for this 
sector. Improving the capabilities of firms in the sector and supporting their technical 
upgradation can yield significant benefits for inclusive growth. 
These vignettes support the importance of targeted capability developments that allowed a 
small number of firms to achieve competitiveness in particular sectors. Like Bangladesh and 
other South Asian countries, competitiveness and growth did not have to await the 
achievement of horizontal ‘doing business’ conditions. Corruption demands and 
bureaucratic obstacles were important, but entrepreneurs could work their way around 
these problems provided they could develop their organizational and technological 
capabilities. Clearly, if overall good governance could somehow be achieved, the acquisition 
of capabilities would become easier as many types of market contracts for investment in 
learning would become more feasible. However, achieving significant improvements in 
‘good governance’ conditions is not very likely in developing countries. The South Asian 
experience, including that coming from our three vignettes, shows that significant progress 
is possible by targeting soluble problems like capability development. As a broad-based 
economy develops, there is likely to be stronger and more effective demand for a rule-
following society. But a rule-following society cannot be wished into existence before a 
distribution of power within society supports it.  
The Nepali firm vignettes and the experiences of neighbouring countries show that foreign 
partnerships were an important mechanism for capability transfers. It is important not to 
confuse this with all types of foreign direct investments (FDI). Most FDI does not transfer 
capabilities to domestic firms, and have limited spillover effects. The policy challenge is to 
design incentives for foreign investors to transfer capabilities to domestic firms. In the 
Indian and Bangladeshi case this took the form of policy instruments that incentivized 
foreign partners to invest in the transfer of capabilities to domestic firms, and when success 
was achieved in the form of a high valued product, the foreign partner was rewarded with 
significant rents. The details in the Bangladeshi garments and Indian automobile cases (see 
references above) cannot be exactly replicated because the policy design depends on local 
conditions and the sector. However, the general features of a successful policy instrument 
supporting learning is likely to be similar.  
Moreover, political support for and the economic and political benefits of such a strategy 
are likely to be maximized if these types of capability transfer strategies were focused on 
SMEs and the conduit of any policy rents for local companies were local or provincial 
governments. Our discussion of the political settlement suggests that these policies would 
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be easier to police and would be aligned with political demands if such a combination can 
be achieved.  
 
9. Policy Implications  
The political settlement is evolving rapidly in Nepal and institutional and policy reforms 
have to be cognizant of what is feasible and the promoting opportunities opening up. Our 
political settlement analysis suggests that an approach to reform that focuses on creating a 
level playing field based on excellent ‘doing business’ conditions and improving ‘good 
governance’ in the form of a strengthened rule of law and general anti-corruption measures 
is not likely to deliver good results in an early-stage developer like Nepal. Improvements 
along those lines will be very difficult to achieve given the distribution of political power and 
organizational capabilities in the country. Policy makers can sometimes encourage private-
public dialogue in order to promote economic growth and in some contexts this may well 
work. We suggest, however, that this will be difficult in Nepal. The mainstream private 
sector in Nepal is still at relatively low levels of productivity but are nonetheless powerfully 
connected (upper right had quadrant in box 2). Their sources of revenue are therefore not 
productivity-oriented but depend on their political contacts for supplies of rents. The 
political establishment also often uses its business links for activities like informal financing. 
Given this collusive relationship between business and politics it is highly unlikely that a 
private-public dialogue will be a driver for productivity growth. Moreover, the political 
settlements analysis points out that the priority is not to indiscriminately try and remove all 
types of rents or even the informal ones.  Many formal and informal rents play a potentially 
critical role in maintaining political stability, enhancing organizational capabilities of firms, 
or addressing other market failures, while some rents are indeed very damaging and should 
be targeted where feasible.  
The most feasible and potentially high-impacts reform would be to seize the opportunity 
of the current discourse on institutional and political devolution to support the 
development of broader productive and organizational capabilities at the SME level across 
regions and sectors in Nepal. Nepal does have emerging pockets of productivity that could 
usefully be targeted by feasible policies to achieve global competitiveness. Our sectoral 
policy recommendations are likely to be feasible because none of these emerging sectors 
provide large sources of rents for powerful Nepali organizations (except tourism to some 
extent). As a result, policy changes affecting rents to these sectors are less likely to elicit 
powerful resistance from established interests. Government may also support some of 
these policies because they do not have very large resource implications, do not affect 
politically connected big business interests, and are potentially employment-generating in a 
context where inclusive growth is an important part of the political discourse. Our focus is 
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also on manufacturing where we believe the maximum potential for both employment and 
productivity development lies. However service sectors like tourism, which in Nepal’s case 
possesses high employment potential, can also be a driver of inclusive growth in the 
country. 
The challenge is to address one of the key constraints on competitiveness, the missing or 
weak organizational capabilities of business organizations. The usual response to the 
observation of uncompetitive companies is to suggest technical and vocational training for 
the workforce. This is important but not sufficient. Nepal has a national vocational training 
policy but comparative evidence from South Asia and beyond suggests that firms and 
sectors that rapidly developed their competitiveness in global export sectors did so largely 
because they solved problems of organizational capability development through 
partnerships with competitive firms in more advanced countries. Once employment starts 
to grow rapidly in a sector, specific skills shortages are revealed and have to be addressed 
by skills training programmes. But providing skills training without linking this to the needs 
of firms that are already competitive can be very wasteful. It is very likely to result either in 
the transmission of skills that are actually not likely to be required, poor quality training as 
employers themselves do not have the capability to validate quality, or the outmigration of 
skilled people who cannot then find a local job.  
One of our important policy recommendations is that small politically-unconnected firms 
in sectors like garments and assembly industries would need to be supported for 
capability development for managing the production process, backed up if necessary with 
skills development programmes targeting the workforce. In many cases, particularly in the 
labour-intensive industries that we are focusing on, the latter is less of a priority and may 
not even be needed at the initial stages because there may be enough unemployed skills of 
different types already available in the labour market. We saw that all three of our 
successful companies used trainers from more competitive countries to learn how to 
organise production better as well as train workers where necessary. However, investments 
in firms’ organizational capabilities create rents for firms and the policy has to be well-
designed in the context of the specific political settlement if resources are not to be wasted. 
One strategy that may work, building on the experiences of India and Bangladesh, is to 
devise policies that incentivize strategic partnerships with successful foreign companies that 
are moving out of particular technologies or are themselves looking for joint ventures to 
transfer capabilities, technology and training to domestic Nepali companies.  
The instrument that is least likely to be distorted or captured given the political settlement 
is one that provides a large ex post reward to the foreign investor once success in exporting 
has been established. The creation of competitive domestic companies is particularly 
important because foreign companies are much more footloose (as the Nepali garments 
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industry experienced) and it is psychologically and organizationally much easier for domestic 
entrepreneurs to imitate and replicate successful domestic companies than successful 
foreign-owned ones. This is because the domestic company will be accessing sources of 
finance, value chains, and operating through institutional rules and policies that other 
domestic companies can easily replicate, while foreign companies have many specific 
arrangements that domestic companies may find hard to copy without much extra effort.  
Most ex-post rents are in the form tax incentives and these might end up attracting FDI only 
for reasons of tax arbitrage and not facilitate technology transfer. One method of designing 
ex-post rents could be to design a form of build-operate-transfer (BOT) financing where the 
foreign firm in the targeted sectors are assured full ownership and perhaps even profit 
repatriation (though this might face political resistance) for a certain period after which it 
has to transfer some ownership to a private firm in the country. Of course the remit of this 
paper is not to provide an exact design of such a financing arrangement and any such 
instrument will need careful thought, but this could be a direction of movement. Most BOT 
models used in the infrastructure sectors require strong enforcement capabilities and profit 
realisation is long term in nature making the incentive structure more amenable to 
distortion. The options we are suggesting for capability development investments do not 
necessarily have these problems.  
We deliberately focused on sectors that were low to medium technology because 
replicability is an important criterion for sustaining inclusive growth. We also made a 
pragmatic selection of sectors like tea, tourism, iron and steel and garments, because these 
types of sectors satisfy the criteria for replicability, generate lots of jobs and can earn the 
foreign exchange that Nepal needs to fund its imports. Some allowance will have to be 
made for the fact that manufacturing in Nepal faces other constraints that we have referred 
to: higher wages, incentives for skilled workers to migrate, exchange rate and transportation 
cost disadvantages and so on. Immediate improvements in the exchange rate regime or the 
removal of other disincentives are not likely. We identified quite difficult rent interests 
sustaining those policies. Early stage policy will have to work within those constraints and 
realize that quite substantial productivity improvements have to be achieved through 
capability development if domestic Nepali firms are to become competitive. We believe this 
is possible, and our vignettes showing the successful operation of a small number of Nepali 
firms in these sectors validates our assessment. Given that most migrants are men, an 
important idea to test would be to see if offering training and capability development 
opportunities in sectors that can employ women helps retention and generates inclusive 
growth more rapidly. This would also help to further gender inclusion. 
As Nepal’s remittance economy is likely to remain dominant for some time, a further 
possibility is to use some of these remittances more productively. Bonds and other 
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investment vehicles could be set up to encourage workers remitting funds to put some of 
this directly into foreign exchange bonds that could be used to finance investments in 
growth sectors. This could help to increase the savings rate in the economy and also provide 
investors in new sectors with lower cost capital to import machinery. The feasibility of this 
would depend on the capacity of the banking system to do this intermediation, and even 
more so, on their willingness to do this, as it will divert funds from the lending that banks do 
to more lucrative trading activities where more rents are captured. A similar instrument was 
implemented in the hydro-power sector. Though they were not very effective, addressing 
some of the design flaws could ensure they could be developed for more broad-based 
investments. One reason for the failure of the bonds seems to have been higher transaction 
costs in administering them as they required separate bank accounts. This suggests that a 
fully self-financing bond may not survive because of market failures. Limited state or donor 
co-financing support may be necessary. The other reasons for their under-subscription were 
that migrant workers could find higher returns in commercial banks, the bonds were not 
marketed effectively enough and Nepali migrants to India and OECD countries were not 
allowed to buy them. Addressing each of these reasons for failure could be a positive step 
towards creating such bonds that are more popular among diaspora. 
There could also be a fund for overseas workers to invest in that could operate like a mini 
sovereign wealth fund that could invest in inclusive growth sectors within Nepal, for 
instance in more mature SMEs with clear potential. These funds have significant 
management and governance requirements to protect investors, but we are suggesting 
possibilities that could potentially be technically addressed, perhaps with small pilots given 
that these funds will be investing incomes of fairly vulnerable sections of society.  
Tourism is an established service sector that can also be developed using the capability 
development approach. One of our respondents who has long been associated with and is 
successful in Nepal’s tourism sector suggested that one way of strengthening tourism in 
Nepal would be to highlight what he described as its ‘endemic’ nature (though the word can 
have a negative connotation). What he meant is that if people want to see Mount Everest 
up close they can only do so in Nepal. Or if birdwatchers want to track the spiny babbler 
they have to come to Nepal. He argues there are many more such examples and the Nepali 
tourism sector can develop this as a marketing strategy. While building a completely 
separate infrastructure for this type of tourism will be costly, a well-designed campaign on 
social media (rather than expensive international electronic media advertising) could target 
‘dedicated’ tourists and upgrade identified facilities to cater to these tourists. Here too, the 
development of a broad range of hotels and possibly even home-stays of a high enough 
quality to deal with this non-luxury segment of tourism could create broad employment 
opportunities if appropriate levels of capability can be developed.  
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Tea, especially orthodox and organic orthodox varieties, is another potential growth 
sector. This is already gathering momentum in Nepal but the country remains a small 
exporter. Both of these variants command a premium in international markets relative to 
CTC tea. The cultivation of organic tea is costly but commands more market value. More 
needs to be done for the sector with policy design that focuses on branding and marketing 
as well as helping to develop agro-extension services required for organic tea (for instance 
cattle rearing for manure) that can actually be self-sustaining. Given that this sector is 
largely supplied by farmers with small-holdings the scope for inclusive employment and 
developing community oriented backward linkages is high. Some headway has already been 
made as some organic tea growers have shown, but the investments have been made by 
individual firms, and this is where targeted policy for the sector could accelerate growth. 
The planned auction house in Jhapa which has reportedly been stalled by the Ministry of 
Finance could also help Nepali tea garner global markets. Most Nepali tea is sold through 
the Kolkata auctions in India but an auction house in Nepal for its own teas will allow it to 
attract more international buyers. This could be an area of policy focus too. Auction houses 
have sometimes been criticised for introducing a layer of middlemen into the tea market 
but given its global nature brokers at auctions act as aggregators with better market 
information than a local producer.  
As Nepal is a land-locked country, transportation is a major issue for developing domestic 
industries. Air freight could make sense for higher valued products, those for rapid 
replenishments and for emergencies. Nepal mainly uses one Indian port (Kolkata) which is 
also one of India’s least efficient. Nepal has recently been given sporadic access to a more 
efficient southern port but it is located much further from the Nepali border. Another 
option is to use Haldia port, close to Kolkata which is more efficient. However the average 
export time for Nepal is 42 days adding pressure to its already low competitiveness. In order 
to ease some of the constraints around transportation feasibility studies could be conducted 
for air freight facilities for high-value exporters in Nepal. If Nepali consignments were 
cleared fast enough at Kolkata Port air freighting would not be necessary as an alternative 
because it costs 12-16 times as much as ocean transport (World Bank 2009). But as it now 
stands Nepali policy makers will have to think out of the box. Connectivity with China will 
certainly also help through the proposed new dry port but that will not solve the problem of 
supplying lucrative markets in the West.  
While space at Kathmandu airport is limited there are plans for expansion and passenger 
flight services could be used instead of chartered ones to lower costs. Kathmandu is well 
connected to Middle Eastern cities with some of the world’s biggest logistics hubs. There are 
precedents for using air services in Africa (in the case of Kenya and Tanzania) and with 
successful results (World Bank 2009). There could be learnings for Nepal here that allow it 
to circumvent some of the transport bottlenecks it faces.  
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These are examples where developmental rent management can be feasibly improved 
without a significant likelihood of being blocked by powerful rent-capturing interests. 
However, this does not mean that other areas of rent management need not be addressed. 
In our previous section we identified specific cases where improvements in rent 
management in each of these more challenging areas may be feasible.  
Most importantly, there is a need to adequately prepare for any institutional devolution 
that may happen as a result of power being devolved to provinces and local governments. 
The most feasible strategies at the local government level here would be ones that require 
some form of co-ordination and collective action, for instance in organising skill 
development programmes based on the targeted sectors in tandem with the training that 
takes place for developing organizational capability. Effective capability development for 
homestays in Nepal could prove to be most beneficial in such a context. This would be in 
line with our recommendation of ‘endemic’ tourism. 
We believe that the sustainability of devolution will depend on matching the resource 
allocation decisions that are devolved with developmental policies of the types discussed 
here, so that the devolution becomes sustainable. Sustainability requires that the resource 
allocations at the local level create dispersed but sustainable sources of power, ideally 
based on new productive and employment generation capabilities at the local level. This is 
essential to create effective power at the local level to sustain devolved institutions over 
time. This is an exciting and important challenge but how best to do this can only be 
discussed in detail as we learn more about how devolution will actually occur. Development 
partners and Nepali policy think tanks can, however, already start thinking in a joined-up 
way about these rent management challenges to achieve sustainable improvements in 
inclusive growth and inclusive politics in Nepal. 
 
10. References  
Asian Development Bank 2009. Country Diagnostics Studies, Highlights, Nepal: Critical Development 
Constraints. ADB, DFID, ILO: Manila, London, Geneva. 
 
Asian Development Bank 2012. Country Poverty Analysis (Detailed), Nepal   
 ADB: Manila. 
 
Balassa, Bela 1964. The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal, Journal of Political Economy 
72 (6): 584-96. 
 
The Economist 2011. Low road through the Himalayas, (by Banyan)  May 31st 2011  Available 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/05/aid-and-corruption-nepal> 
 
Baral, LS 2012. Autocratic Monarchy: Politics in Panchayat Nepal. Kathmandu: Martin Chautari. 
 
69 
 
Basu, Narayani 2017. Nepal-China-India: Three’s a Crowd? The Diplomat. Available 
<https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/nepal-china-india-threes-a-crowd/> 
 
Black, Anthony, Pallavi Roy, Amirah El-Haddad and Kamil Yilmaz 2018. The Political Economy of 
Automotive Industry Development Policy in Middle Income Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Egypt, 
India, South Africa and Turkey. Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID): Manchester. 
 
Chapagain, Binod and Tina Sanio 2012. Forest user groups and peacebuilding in Nepal in Lujala, P and 
SA Rustad (eds) High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding, London: Routledge. 
 
Chatterjee, Partha 1997. The Present History of West Bengal: Essays in Political Criticism. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Economic Times 2017. Yogi Adityanath's royal connection: Former royal family of Nepal trace their 
origin to Guru Gorakshanath (by Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy)  Mar 20, 2017  Available 
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/yogi-adityanaths-royal-
connection-former-royal-family-of-nepal-trace-their-origin-to-guru-
gorakshanath/articleshow/57722870.cms> 
 
Dhakal, Ameet and Jhalak Subedi 2006. Local Business, Local Peace:  the Peacebuilding Potential of the 
Domestic Private Sector. International Alert: London. 
 
My Republica 2017. Against Poverty, (by Dhungana, Siromani)  Available 
<http://www.myrepublica.com/news/29171/> 
 
Government of Nepal National Planning Commission and UNDP 2014. Nepal Human Development 
Report: Beyond Geography Unlocking Human Potential. Government of Nepal: Kathmandu. 
 
Guneratne, Arjun 2002. Many Tongues, One People: The Making of Tharu Identity in Nepal. Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Hacchethu, Krishna 2006. Political Parties of Nepal. Baha Occasional Papers, edited by Thapa, Deepak. 
Social Science Baha: Lalitpur. 
 
IECCD 2014. Development Cooperation Report. Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance International 
Economic Cooperation Coordination Division Kathmandu. 
 
International Crisis Group 2007. Nepal's Troubled Tarai Region. International Crisis Group: Brussels. 
 
Jha, Prashant 2017. Thoughts on Future of Madhes Movement. Available 
<http://www.madhesiyouth.com/political/thoughts-future-madhes-movement-prashant-jha/> 
 
Jones, Harry and Yurendra Basnett 2013. Foreign employment and inclusive growth in Nepal: What 
can be done to improve impacts for the people and the country? Overseas Development Institute: 
London. 
 
Jones, Stephen 2010. Policymaking during  Political Transition in Nepal. Working paper series 2010-
03. Oxford Policy Management: Oxford. 
 
Kalecki, Michal 1976. Observations on Social and Economic Aspects of Intermediate Regimes, in 
Kalecki, Michal (ed.) Essays on the Developing Economies, Brighton: The Harvester Press. 
70 
 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 1995. State Failure in Weak States: A Critique of New Institutionalist 
Explanations, in Harriss, John, Janet Hunter and Colin M. Lewis (eds) The New Institutional Economics 
and Third World Development, pp. 71-86, London: Routledge. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2000a. Rents, Efficiency and Growth, in Khan, Mushtaq H. and K.S. Jomo (eds) 
Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia, pp. 21-69, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2000b. Class, Clientelism and Communal Politics in Bangladesh, in Panikkar, 
K.N., Terence J. Byres and Utsa Patnaik (eds) The Making of History: Essays Presented to Irfan Habib, 
pp. 572-606, New Delhi: Tulika. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2005. Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the Case 
for Democracy in Developing Countries, Democratization 12 (5): 705-25. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2006. Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries: the Limits of 
Conventional Economic Analysis, in Rose-Ackerman, Susan (ed.) International Handbook on the 
Economics of Corruption, pp. 216-44, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2010. Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing 
Institutions. Research Paper Series on Governance for Growth. SOAS, University of London: London. 
Available <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2012a. The Political Economy of Inclusive Growth, in de Mello, Luiz and Mark 
A. Dutz (eds) Promoting Inclusive Growth: Challenges and Policies, pp. 15-54, Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Available <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264168305-3-en> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2012b. Beyond Good Governance: An Agenda for Developmental Governance, 
in Sundaram, Jomo Kwame and Anis Chowdhury (eds) Is Good Governance Good for Development?, 
pp. 151-82, London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2013a. Bangladesh: Economic Growth in a Vulnerable Limited Access Order, in 
North, Douglass, John Wallis, Steven Webb and Barry Weingast (eds) In the Shadow of Violence: 
Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development, pp. 24-69, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Available <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/11680/1/Bangladesh_LAO.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2013b. Technology Policies and Learning with Imperfect Governance, in Stiglitz, 
Joseph and Justin Yifu Lin (eds) The Industrial Policy Revolution 1. The Role of Government Beyond 
Ideology, pp. 79-115, London: Palgrave. Available <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/17296> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2013c. The Political Settlement, Growth and Technical Progress in Bangladesh. 
DIIS Working Paper  No. 2013:01. Danish Institute for International Studies: Copenhagen. Available 
<http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2013/WP2013-01.Bangladesh%20-%20Mushtaq-H-
Khan.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2013d. Political Settlements and the Design of Technology Policy, in Stiglitz, 
Joseph, Justin Yifu Lin and Ebrahim Patel (eds) The Industrial Policy Revolution 2. Africa in the Twenty-
First Century, pp. 243-80, London: Palgrave. Available <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/17297> 
 
71 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2014. Corruption and Private Sector Development: Bangladesh Case Study. 
DFID Corruption and Private Sector Development Study. DFID: unpublished report. Available 
<https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22640/> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2017. Introduction: Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions, 
African Affairs Virtual Issue: Political Settlements Research in Africa: 1-20. Available HTTP: 
<https://academic.oup.com/afraf/pages/political_settlements_virtual_issue> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain, Antonio Andreoni and Pallavi Roy 2016. Anti-Corruption in Adverse Contexts: 
A Strategic Approach. SOAS: London. Available <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23495/> 
 
Lamsal, Madan and Sanjeev Sharma 2016. Are we Catching up with the World: Nepali Business Houses 
in New Economy. Kathmandu. 
 
Margon 2012. Management of the Nepali Economy: Survey and Findings Kathmandu. 
 
Population Education & Health Research Centre 2016. Nepal Population Report. Government of Nepal, 
Ministry of Population and Environment: Kathmandu. 
 
Kathmandu Post 2017. Women highly active in informal trade with India: Sawtee report, (by Post 
Report)  May 3, 2017  Available <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-05-03/women-
highly-active-in-informal-trade-with-india-sawtee-report.html> 
 
Prasai, Sagar 2007. The ‘Drivers of Legitimacy’ in Nepal The Asia Foundation: Kathmandu. 
 
Prasai, Sagar 2012. Political Economy Analysis of Local Governance in Nepal with Special Reference to 
Nepal. The Asia Foundation: Kathmandu. 
 
Pritchett, Lant and Eric Werker 2012. Developing the Guts of a Gut (Grand Unified Theory): Elite 
Commitment and Inclusive Growth. ESID Working Paper  No. 16. University of Manchester: 
Manchester. 
 
Rai, Nirjan  and Saumitra  Neupane 2017. Unbundling the NEA: A Political Economy of Reforming 
Nepal’s Public Utility with Special Reference to its Transmission Component. Niti Foundation: 
Kathmandu. 
 
Robinson, James A. 2007. The Political Economy of Development in Nepal. Mimeograph. 
 
Roy, Pallavi. 2013. The Political Economy of Growth under Clientelism: An Analysis of Gujarat, Tamil 
Nadu and Pakistan. PhD, Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London Available 
<http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/18261/> 
 
SAWTEE 2006. Tea Industry in Nepal and its Impact on Poverty. South Asia Watch on Trade Economics 
& Environment Kathmandu. 
 
Shakya, Mallika 2011. Nepali Economic History through the Ethnic Lens: Changing State Alliances with 
Entrepreneurial Elites, in Lawoti, Mahendra and Susan I Hangen (eds) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict 
in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990, London: Routledge. 
 
South Asia Enterprise Development Facility 2013. Stakeholder Perception Survey. IFC, HMG, NORAD: 
Kathmandu. 
72 
 
 
Suwal, Rudra and Bishnu Pant 2009. Measuring Informal Sector Economic Activities in Nepal Paper 
Prepared for the Special IARIW-SAIM Conference on  “Measuring the Informal Economy in Developing 
Countries” 23-26 September 2009. Kathmandu. 
 
New Business Age 2017. Nepal Losing Out On FDI To Neighbouring Indian States, (by Unknown)  
Available <http://www.newbusinessage.com/Articles/view/699> 
 
Washbrook, David A. 1981. Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India, Modern Asian Studies 15 
(3): 649-721. 
 
World Bank 2009. Air Freight: A Market Study with Implications for Landlocked Countries. World Bank: 
Wasington DC. 
 
World Bank 2017. Climbing Higher: Toward a Middle Income Nepal. Macroeconomics & Fiscal 
Management Global Practice South Asia Region: Washington. 
 
Xu, Jiajun  and Sarah  Hager 2017. Applying the Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework to 
Nepal. CDP Background Paper No. 35 United Nations Department of Economic & Social Affairs: New 
York. 
 
 
